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Making Cents of it All: Why Bottle Bills? 
 Resource reuse and recycling has been commonly and creatively incorporated into 
communities worldwide in a wide variety of ways. This type of process only became formalized 
into its own sector after the Industrial Revolution incited the advent of a society that uses resources 
quickly, often inefficiently, and without consideration of disposal costs. Disposal costs include the 
transport, breakdown, and economic valuation of the costs, or benefits (typically the latter) that 
waste disposal leaves upon people and the surrounding environment.  However, in the present 
economic system it is typically more profitable for producers to skip this step, as there is often no 
requirement to cover these costs or take preventative action to reduce waste. This lack of 
acknowledgement of the production of waste serves to make it invisible, despite the very tangible 
impacts that waste inflict upon industry, people, and communities.  As Ayers describes, “we persist 
in referring to the ‘final consumption’ of goods as though material objects such as fuels, materials, 
and finished goods somehow disappeared into the void” (284).  
In an effort to push back against this erasure of waste and other environmental issues, many 
places implement forms of structural environmental policy. There are two major kinds of 
environmental regulation: command and control and economic market-based regulation 
(Harrington et al., 17; Olmstead). These two typeos differ in the techniques they use to encourage 
compliance, or discourage noncompliance, with environmental policy. Command and control 
policies are “expected to solve the problem either through control of the processes that lead to the 
problem ... or through amelioration of the problem after it occurs” (Holling, 329). This type of 
policy creates sweeping solutions to problems with the understanding that they are “well-bounded” 
issues, with simple cause and effect origins, while in reality many environmental issues are rooted 
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in a “complex, nonlinear, and poorly understood natural world” that are not easily “solved” by 
command and control policies (329).  
A more flexible method, and the type that is the subject of this paper, is market-based 
environmental regulation. These types of systems use economic incentives as the driving force 
behind its policy, rather than punitive threats for noncompliance. While market-based regulation 
can inflict higher costs on those being regulated, they tend to provide significant economic savings 
through its efficient system (Harrington, 17). Bottle deposit systems experience similar types of 
successes and struggles, as they greatly reduce litter, promote recycling, but have been criticized 
for increasing costs to consumers and the beverage industry. 
The Container Recycling Institute defines a bottle bill as, “a minimum refundable deposit 
on beer, soft drink and other beverage containers in order to ensure a high rate of recycling or 
reuse.”  In the course of this research I will use the terms ‘bottle bills’ and ‘container deposit 
legislation’ interchangeably. Both terms refer to all types of recyclables that are currently covered 
in some container deposit systems in the United States which can include glass bottles, plastic 
bottles, and aluminum cans for the beverages beer, malt drinks, soda, mixed spirits, quine, liquor, 
juice, sports drinks, and mineral water. This type of litter is targeted by a deposit system because 
beverage containers of these types historically make up between 40-60 percent of the total volume 
of litter and are made up of a type of material that is easily recycled (Geiger, vii; Moore, 59).  
Currently ten U.S. states and Guam have active container deposit legislation, as do many 
other countries around the world including Canada, Australia, South Korea and others. While 
bottle bills have proliferated across the nation and the world, these legislations are not all identical 
and their distinct variances can produce differing results and impacts. This research will investigate 
the influencing factors in passing or defeating bottle bills as well as the various nuances and 
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implications of the differences between the legislations in the states of Oregon, Maine, Washington 
and Massachusetts.  
Bottle deposit market-based environmental regulation spread like wildfire through the 
environmentally activated American political system of the 1970s, resulting in six more states 
enacting various bottle deposit systems within the decade. Immediately, oppositional arguments 
against bottle deposit systems emerged from the beverage industry, citing the legislation’s 
detrimental effects on beverage prices, beverage industry jobs, and called its litter-reduction 
impact mediocre. This furious spread of policy and consequent controversy also created significant 
space for research and reports on the efficacy of bottle bills--many of which are consulted and 
analyzed for bias in the course of this research. Many even assumed that a national bottle bill was 
inevitable (Beverage Container Reuse Hearings, 281).  
My form of assessment for analyzing the comparative successes or failures of bottle bill 
systems through a wide range of variables is the Triple Bottom Line (TBL) definition of 
sustainable practices. A term coined as a multidimensional response to responsible business 
management, this framework requires consideration of environmental, “social and economic 
dimensions of sustainable development” (Elkington, 1997). As this research deals with an 
intersectional issue of business, policy, and economics that have resulting environmental, social, 
and economic impacts, this TBL assessment of true sustainability best allows me to compare and 
contrast the ways in which some states’ bottle bill systems flourish or fall short. 
This research is a case-based comparative analysis between bottle bill campaigns and 
policies in four different U.S. states in order to analyze the determining and preventative variables 
in the passage of bottle bills. Additionally, this study compares what ways these legislations are 
ultimately effective or ineffective in meeting economic, environmental, and social goals. These 
Bluffstone, 6 
four case study states have been selected to exemplify several public, private, and mixed systems 
that display varying outcomes in participation in the program and impacts on litter and local 
economies.  
Bottle bill systems are well-suited to be analyzed with this comprehensive framework 
because they can provide economic, social, and environmental benefits to the places where this 
kind of deposit system is implemented. Economically, bottle bills create jobs in redemption, 
transportation, and create high quality recycled products in high demand by recycling facilities. 
Further, the unredeemed deposits from containers not returned results in a large pool of money 
that can be strategically used for state spending, environmental projects, or to fund the container 
program itself. Environmentally, bottle bills have proven themselves to be powerful mechanism 
to decrease litter and to conserve resources through a monetary incentive to reuse and recycle. 
While it is to be expected that much of the literature on the subject focuses on the cost and 
economic efficiency of the market-based regulation, I believe that there remains a hole in the 
literature that fails to directly recognize the ways that deposit systems are entangled in local, state, 
and even international social systems. It is within this arena that this research is one of the first to 
explore the social services and social and environmental justice aspects of bottle bills. Scrounging 
for metals, plastics, and glass increases with the presence of bottle bill systems and the opportunity 
for redemption provides a valuable social service as a source of income for people who are 
fundraising, low-income, or the unhoused.1 Scrounging here, is defined as “to seek to obtain by 
irregular means” (Ferrell, 8).  
                                               
1 Here I use the term ‘unhoused’ rather than ‘homeless’ because the latter term equates a house with a home, which 
is not always the case (OSL). 
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This research is a case-based comparative analysis between bottle bills and bottle bill 
campaigns in four different U.S. states in order to discover what variables support and prevent the 
passage of bottle bills, and in what ways this type of system is ultimately effective in meeting 
economic, environmental, and social goals. The foundation of this research is built upon nine 
interviews with experts, activists, and government staffers who are or have been previously 
involved with the bottle bill systems in their respective states. These insights have proved 
invaluable to the quality and relevance of my work, and I greatly appreciate their knowledge and 
willingness to share it with me. 
This research is an in-depth investigation into a highly specific issue, but the conclusions 
found here ultimately display wider implications about environmental policy on the state level, 
suggest powerful campaign techniques, and consider the true sustainability of recycling in the 
context of the globalized world of today. Bottle bills also brings the concept of “consumer 
citizenship,” into the discussion. Consumer Citizenship is defined as, “an individual who makes 
choices based on ethical, social, economic and ecological considerations. The consumer citizen 
actively contributes to the maintenance of just and sustainable development by caring and acting 
responsibly on family, national and global levels” (Thoreson, 7). Bottle bills are a type of consumer 
citizenship because rather than considering a way to end the production of an enormous amount 
of beverage containers, it develops a system to make the end result of this production not as 
environmentally detrimental. While acknowledging the significance of this standpoint and the 
unintended consequences both positive and negative that can result from it, this study ultimately 
takes a critical view of the way that capitalism limits the imagination of environmentalism and 
corresponding policy to stay within the constraints of consumerism. 
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The following chapter outlines the relevant major literature concerning bottle bills: state 
environmental history, political campaign science and strategy, and the international recycling 
market. Chapter 3 is a depiction of my methodological structure for this research, as well as an 
explanation of the independent variables that influence the effectiveness of the system and the 
outcome of bottle bill campaigns Chapter 4 and 5 analyze and compare the bottle bill campaigns 
in the case study states of Oregon and Maine, and Washington and Massachusetts, respectively. In 
Chapter 6 all case studies are studied under a different form of comparative analysis to determine 
relative success of the bottle bill programs under the framework of Triple Bottom Line 
Sustainability. Chapter 7 explores the international implications of bottle bill systems and tracks 
the travel and impact of recycled materials internationally. The final chapter will conclude the 













Scholarship and Perspectives on Bottle Deposit Systems and Related Issues 
 
Refillable to Disposable: Setting the Stage for Bottle Bills 
Bottle Bills represent a complex intersection of politics, private industry, local economy, 
environmentalism, social services, and global trade. A Pigouvian tax system is the inspiration for 
the bottle deposit system, which is one that “requires a consumer to pay a fee at the time of disposal 
that is equal to the marginal damage caused by the disposal” (Ashenmiller, 2011). Using a market-
based disincentive to regulate littering, bottle bill systems instead require a fee payment at the 
point of purchase. Then, it establishes a deposit refund program that refunds the initial fee paid 
when containers are appropriately recycled.  
Container-deposit systems of recycling materials are a worldwide phenomenon and have 
long been used both formally through legislatively authorized procedures, and informally through 
both private business efforts and street scrounging. In the United States before 1935 most 
beverages were sold in refillable glass bottles from family firms and businesses. Within these small 
scale grocers and corner stores, an informal bottle return system was built upon container reuse, 
where the glasses would be reused up to 50 times until too worn down to reuse again, when it was 
then permanently recycled (Gitlitz, 2013). This system is still common in many countries today, 
even in the absence of monetary incentives due to the refillable nature of glass bottles and the 
presence of refilling systems by beverage companies (ILSR).  
However, the intense period of technological innovations during and following World War II 
spurred the beginnings of today’s culture of disposability, largely through the rising popularity of 
new materials for containers. Steel was used for beer and soda cans starting in 1935, but was beat 
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out by the powerful introduction of single-use aluminum cans in the late 1950s. Plastic was also a 
heavyweight addition to the materials arena. Post-war, one plastic executive stated, “virtually 
nothing was made of plastic and anything could be” (Rogers, 2005). A 1955 article in Life 
magazine called “Throwaway Living” celebrates the potential for human liberation through a 
culture of disposability—especially within the home (Life Magazine, 1955).  Plastic bottles hit the 
U.S. market in the 1950s and quickly became popular as a very common one-way product for 
stores, grocers, and restaurants (Walth, 284). In the late 1960s this sense of freedom from single-
use items began to be truly questioned by the growing environmental movement. Milestone 
publications such as Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring brought the national attention to the unintended 
dangers caused by commonly used chemicals and disposable products. 
Reports and Studies on Bottle Bill Impacts 
Studies disagree on the significance that beverage containers hold within the makeup of the 
total litter portfolio prior to any bottle bill system. One study shows that beverage containers make 
up about 20% of the total litter portfolio2 in rural areas, and 10% in urban regions, but the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates that beverage containers represent about 20-
30% of all litter by piece count, and 40-60% of volume (Geiger, vii; Moore, 59).3 With this 
discrepancy in mind, it was still the case that outdoorsman Richard Chambers was so dismayed by 
the prevalence of litter in his community that he brought the preliminary idea of a deposit system 
to the attention of several prominent state politicians. Ultimately, the Oregon State Legislature 
passed the nation’s inaugural bottle bill legislation in 1971.  
                                               
2 However, whether this litter metric is measured by percent piece count or percent volume is unclear. 
3 Another item that greatly contributes to litter is paper products, although no other single group of throwaway 
products are as prevalent in litter as the beverage container bottle or can (Maine House, 3/25/76, 686). 
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A large portion of the literature consulted for this research include reports and analyses of the 
functioning bottle bills. These policy reports focus on the litter reduction, costs, energy 
conservation, and economic impact from state container deposit systems. Sources including 
Gudger and Bailes (1974) and government reports of the Office of Technology (1979) on the 
subject have provided a large amount of the economic and energy specific data that has been 
referenced throughout the course of this research.  
These policy reports tend to be either highly favorable of a highly antagonistic toward bottle 
bills. Robert Geiger, for one, is critical of them in his piece, “Beverage Container Deposit Laws: 
Are They Effective?” The major criticisms here include that the major goal of beverage container 
deposit policies, at their time of passage, to decrease litter fails because beverage containers are 
only a small fraction of the total litter profile. Additionally, he argues that while bottle bills may 
establish some entry-level jobs, they take away more highly-skilled positions within the beverage 
manufacturing industry. He argues that this is the case because the greater system needed for bottle 
bills creates more lower-wage jobs for sorters and transporters, but decreases the amount of skilled 
manufacturing positions due to the presence of a competing market of recycled materials (62). 
Instead of a mandatory bottle bill, Geiger supports voluntary recycling systems that include 
command and control methods of fines for littering culprits.  The author shares several examples 
of Washington state and Ohio’s alternative approach to litter control that he claims, “demonstrates 
that American communities can be clean without overburdening local government budgets and 
consumer pocketbooks” (Geiger, 71).  
Similarly, Moore and Scott lay out a wider survey of the impacts of Bottle Bills during an anti-
regulatory period in the country’s history during the Reagan administration. In their 1983 research, 
they begin by noting the caveat that there exist several flawed research designs underlying so-
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called empirical studies in the field. Their major results show that with this caution in mind, bottle 
bills provide positive environmental benefits, but have shown to cause negative economic results 
in regards to lower employment of higher level jobs in the beverage industry and increases in 
container prices and production costs at least in the short-term (77).  
Other studies have shown far more supportive results for bottle bills. Don Waggoner, an 
Oregon businessman who worked to pass the state’s bottle bill lays out the benefits of the Oregon 
system in his survey conducted through the Oregon Environmental Council called, Oregon’s Bottle 
Bill: Two Years Later. This 1974 report shows that Oregon’s roadside litter decreased by 39% in 
piece count and 47% by volume (xi). Gudger and Bailes specifically investigate the economic 
impacts of the Oregon Bottle Bill and conclude that enforcement costs are minimal, no change in 
sales volume of beer or soft drinks occurred, and inflation skewed the impact of the bottle bill on 
price of beverages and no product price increases could be conclusively supported by the data. 
Further, this study showed that the bottle bill’s standardization of malt beverage bottle sizes has 
made the refillable system more easily implemented (25). This aspect of the bottle bill is elaborated 
upon further, as it also served as a compromise to help gain support of local businesses. 
A frequent contest to bottle deposit systems is that alternative litter laws are more appropriate 
for litter reduction and are less economically intrusive than bottle bill systems. In support of this 
argument, Geiger cites the Institute for Applied Research Study that 73% reduction in litter in 43 
test sites in the state thanks to the presence of the Washington State Litter Control Program, noting 
that 54% of the litter in Washington is from paper products, not beverage containers (1976). While 
voluntary recycling systems may also help reduce litter, it requires far more funding, $1 million in 
the case of Washington State, and necessitates administration to enforce violations (Beverage 
Container Reuse and Recycling Act Hearings, 1977). The bottle bill in Oregon, just next door to 
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Washington, reduced an estimated 47% of its litter and uses no public money to run (ODEQ). The 
system is estimated to have created annual savings of at least $366,000 from not having to pick up 
as much litter as before (Gudger, 68). Further, bottle bills provide a specific infrastructure for 
which to track recycling participation, which expands the impacts of the bottle bill past litter 
reduction to a wider goal of resource conservation that can be guided by comprehensive data 
collection facilitated by a deposit system. 
Types of Sources Referenced 
Legislation, reports, transcripts, task force publications, and committee presentations from 
state governments also shed important light on the multi-step, political process of passing a bottle 
bill. These sources also display the barriers and concerns of stakeholders that faced the legislation 
at the time of the bill’s attempted passage. This research will conduct a thorough exploration of 
the existing or proposed legislation and campaigns of the states Oregon (1971), Maine (1972), 
Washington (1970, 1979 and 1982), and Massachusetts’ proposed bottle bill expansion (2014).  
Ballotpedia is a reliable website to access legislation and corresponding information about 
ballot campaigns and campaign funding that was referenced frequently throughout the course of 
this research. Bottlebill.org is a site managed by the Container Recycling Institute and provides a 
database of bottle bills around the world, key facts, full legislative text, news updates, and has a 
feature to compare aspects of U.S. bottle bills. While it is a source that directly studies, supports 
and promotes Bottle Bills in the United States, it nonetheless is a well-cited, comprehensive 
reference to the details of the types of container deposit systems that are implemented in the US 




There are a multitude of stakeholders who are impacted by state bottle deposit laws. 
Initially, there is the state government. The bill might pass into law through the state legislature 
which would require one or several state legislators to act as sponsors and would involve many 
governmental discussions, compromises, and committees before the final draft is eventually put 
up to a vote and potentially passed. If a bottle bill is passed on the public ballot, then it still requires 
administrative involvement from the government to run and verify the public elections. Depending 
on the details of the bottle bill system, the state government may play a role in the continuing 
management of the deposit system, may use taxpayer money for the program, and in some cases 
the government is the recipient of the funds from the unclaimed bottle deposits. 
Private industry can also be involved in the administration of the bottle bill. As is discussed 
more in later chapters, Oregon has ultimately created a unique management system for its state 
bottle bill that largely excludes the state government and therefore does not use public money in 
its day-to-day functioning of the law. This system uses a cooperative that has the membership of 
98-99% of all beverage distributors within the state of Oregon (Bertges). This consolidation of 
businesses allows the cooperative to streamline the refunds of beverage containers to consumers 
across the state from the various beverage distributors. This entity, called the Oregon Beverage 
Recycling Cooperative (OBRC), is an enormous stakeholder in support of Oregon’s Bottle Bill 
and is funded by the unclaimed deposits for unreturned bottles.  
Consumers are another critical stakeholder and interest group in regards to bottle bills. 
Americans consumers in states with bottle bill systems pay an upfront fee of 2-15 cents (depending 
on the container type) at the checkout counter, and then have the opportunity to receive their 
deposit back upon container redemption. Additionally, it is important to note that bottle deposit 
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systems also are a significant form of income for fundraising efforts, homeless, transient, or low-
income people. Research such as The Empire of Scrounge by Jeff Ferrell discusses the recycling 
and dumpster-diving lifestyle, but there seems to be significant gap in the literature regarding the 
importance of bottle bills for these more social, alternative-income creation benefits (2006). 
Across the nation, support for bottle bills has largely been shown to be positive through both 
opinion polls and demonstrated support through the action of returning beverage containers.  
Consumers react to price of goods during their decision to purchase or not purchase something. 
Because of this basic economic principle, consumers are a central concern of another stakeholder 
group for whom consumption is their bottom line: beverage retailers. Beverage retailers here 
means businesses that are not involved directly in the production of beverage products, but sell 
them secondarily within their businesses directly to the consumers. These stakeholders can range 
greatly in size from family-owned “Mom ‘n Pop” stores to mega grocery corporations. Retailers 
are often linked in with bottle bills because they are concerned about increased prices on beverages 
discouraging consumption. Grocery stores are also some of the most common locations for 
container redemption (Spendelow, Sylver).  Beverage retailers also cite research that states with 
bottle bills often have higher prices of products, which is a method of passing the additional costs 
onto the consumer, (House 3/24/76, 624).  
Beverage producers, distributors, and corporations are also stakeholders in this issue. Beverage 
distributors are different than retailers and producers, as they typically have a business relationship 
with producers and navigate the sale of products to retailers. Most of these corporations are the 
large, national or international companies including The Coca-Cola Company, Anheuser Busch, 
and Pepsi-Cola Company. These beverage corporations are pretty consistently opponents of 
container deposit legislation and bottle bills because of their concern that an increase in the 
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checkout price on their products will cut into their profits by discouraging them from buying as 
many products If a handling fee is present in a bottle deposit system, it sometimes is the distributor 
who must pay the several cent fee per bottle (Gitlitz, 2001). This reality often makes beverage 
distributors anti-bottle bill. Beverage industry members such as bottlers, aluminum smelters, and 
container manufacturers tend to join in oppositional “anti-bottle bill coalitions” with other 
opponents of the legislation. 
McCuan and Stambough, in their study of how contributions to ballot-issues impact election 
results find that there is a strong link between funding source and electoral outcomes, and that it 
is significant to the electorate where the money comes from. However, the details of that 
information is not always widely disseminated (2005).  In the State Legislatures, as well, the anti-
bottle bill funding and lobbying has proven very powerful, despite initial support commonly 
displayed from the public for the legislation. A North Carolina Senator said, "I have touched no 
bill since I have been in the legislature that was more popular with the people -- or more despised 
by the opposition." (North Carolina, Bottlebill.org).  
Corporations are not necessarily anti-environment, although they may take on environmental 
goals for profit-motivated reasons. A phenomenon called “astroturfing” has emerged where 
corporate forces back grassroots movements when the goal is favorable to them (Walker, 293). 
One example relevant to this topic is the Keep America Beautiful group, which was founded in 
1953 with a mission to “inspire and educate people to take action every day to improve and 
beautify their community environment” (KAB). While this goal greatly appealed to 
environmentalists, KAB was actually founded by a group of business representatives from the 
packaging and beverage industries after they realized that the market’s transition to disposable 
products was having a negative impact on litter. Keep America Beautiful has consistently opposed 
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bottle bills, funded oppositional campaigns, and proposed alternative litter legislation that is more 
preferred by the industry, despite the fact that bottle bills have proven to be highly effective at 
litter reduction, the organization’s main goal (“Keep America Beautiful”; Spendelow).  
Recycling agencies or facilities are also stakeholders. Bottle bill systems have shown to 
increase the return rate of beverage containers into the local recycling system (Cahn, 1980). This 
type of legislation tends to increase the amount of material input, and ultimately profit for these 
companies (Moore, 64). Additionally, due to the sorting inherent in the bottle bill process, the 
quality of material for recycling is typically much higher in states with bottle bill systems 
(Lakeman). This is also an important quality to consider when analyzing the way that bottle deposit 
systems fit into the international recycling market, as is considered further in Chapter 7. Another 
group of ardent supporters include the environmental community. The diversion of waste from 
landfills for reuse, energy savings from recycling, less demand for mineral and resource extraction, 
and decreased litter all are reasons that environmentalists support bottle bills (Moore, 60). The 
supporting coalition typically has a foundation of environmental groups.  
This paper examines the details of the container deposit legislation at the point of the legislative 
passage or failure. Research compiled by the Container Recycling Institute displays that there has 
been a significant slowdown in the passage of bottle bill laws and expansions, and even some laws 
that have been repealed. Table 2.1 lays out the timeline of bottle bill related legislations at the state 
level from 1970-2014. This table only includes bills of proposed initial container deposit 
legislation,4 not expansions, that got reached a vote, either within a chamber of the state legislature 
or on the public ballot. It is extremely common that bottle deposit legislation is never brought to a 
                                               
4 Only includes deposit systems, not outright bans on containers. 
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vote or fails meets the requirements for the ballot. In state legislatures, most bottle bills die in 
committee or are otherwise avoided through political means. The following timetable cannot 
encompass all of the hundreds of proposed pieces of bottle bill legislation that were “indefinitely 
postponed” or sent to die in committee. 
 The figure on the next page displays a concentrated rise in bottle bill proposals in the 1970s 
and early 1980s, with a noticeable gap in proposed legislation between 1988 and 2002. Several 
states had multiple attempts to pass bottle deposit systems, with only about half ultimately 
succeeding. Bottle bill legislation on the ballot proves much harder to pass over time, with just 3 
of 12 ballot proposals passing into law. Studies show that the number of initiatives on all issues 
are decreasing, especially at the state level (McCuan, 263). 
One shift on the political stage since most of these bottle bill legislations were passed is 
the 2010 Supreme Court ruling of Citizens United vs Federal Election Commission. The ruling in 
favor of Citizens United legally permits corporations and unions to spend unlimited amounts of 
money on the political candidates of their choice through the intermediate body of a Super PAC. 
John Coates argues that the ruling of Citizens United has prevented politics from reflecting the 
opinions and goals of its individual stakeholders and citizens because it legally protects 





 Research by Haight et al. displays the increasing ease in which these national corporations 
can influence the outcome of a supposedly democratic election (7). For example, large 
corporations like Coca-Cola and Anheuser Busch funnel millions of dollars into anti-bottle bill 
campaigns across the country. Further, bottle bills are not being proposed to state governments as 
frequently, especially within the last five years. In fact, the data and policy sites Ballotpedia, 
Container Recycling Institute and Bottlebill.org, show that only one bottle deposit system, 
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amendment, or expansion has passed the ballot or state legislature since 2010 (Powell). However, 
it is important to note that proposed legislation to repeal bottle deposit systems was also defeated.     
The effort to expand the bottle bill to include more types of beverage containers for 
redemption other than beer and soda containers has been at the center of many political discussions 
of bottle bills over the past decade. This research will specifically explore the 2014 rejection of a 
proposed expansion of the bottle bill to include plastic water bottles in the state of Massachusetts. 
Viscusi et al. explores the specific topic of water bottle recycling practices in their 2009 piece, 
“Discontinuous Behavioral Responses to Recycling Laws and Plastic Water Bottle Deposits.” This 
source is specifically relevant to the case study of Massachusetts. This paper explores the 
contradiction that waterbottles experience in contrast to standard economic theory: for actors to 
either recycle diligently, or not at all. Ultimately, Viscusi concludes that water bottle redemption 
appears differently from the deposit system of other containers because “the measures have a 
transformative effect, shifting individual consumers from not recycling at all to becoming 
committed recyclers. Consistent with our result that people respond in a discontinuous manner to 
recycling incentives, policies have their greatest effect among those who would not already choose 
to recycle” (25).  
Major aspects of the bottle bill literature discuss the deposit price, impacts of the price on 
consumer habits, and the effectiveness of the system on litter reduction. States in the U.S. that have 
bottle bills have deposit prices that range from $0.02 to $0.15, depending upon the type and size 
of container. The impact of bottle bills upon beverage prices with rebate opportunity has been the 
focus of many studies including Criner which found that a comparison of Maine beverage prices 
with non-bottle bill states such as New Hampshire and Rhode Island, Maine sodas were priced 
between 14 and 16 cents higher, and beer was 1-2 cents higher in cost than NH and RI (37). 
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Research conducted by Santoni and Van Cott in 1977 states that for some consumers, mandatory 
deposit laws will increase the price of beverages. Therefore, the system requires a 14.26% decrease 
in litter “in order to be considered efficient” (1977). However, debate began between academics 
of the BLM and these scholars about the methods for measuring litter reduction (Loomis, 1978). 
Loomis maintained that the research in the Santoni and Van Cott paper was misleading in their 
measurement of the change of amount of containers recycled before and after the legislation. This 
type of methodological debate is common within the existing literature on this topic.  
Altogether, state-administered bottle bill systems do create costs, but this net loss is often 
counteracted by assigning a per container price value on unredeemed containers that returns to the 
government through a full or partial escheat. Escheat is, “a common law doctrine that transfers the 
property of a person who dies without heirs to the state (“Unclaimed Deposits”). Depending on 
the amount of containers that are returned or not returned for their deposit by consumers, this can 
be a large source of revenue for the state (“Unclaimed Deposits”). Economic analyses of the 
predicted impact of a bottle bill in the state of Maine lists increased costs for grocers, brewers, 
bottlers, and distributors, but a total gain of over $3 million under a returnable system due to 
reduced litter collection, reduced costs to consumers, and container cost savings for brewers and 
bottlers (O’Brien, 1975; Ginn, 1973).   
Social Issues and the Bottle Bill 
As I mentioned earlier, there is a gap in the literature about the connections between social 
issues and bottle bills. Many of my interviewed sources have shared anecdotal information that 
bottle bills are a powerful form of alternative income creation and fundraising, albeit one that is 
tinged with the stigma associated with “trash” (Ferrell, 3). A first-of-its kind study found that bottle 
deposit systems are most commonly used by the lowest wage earners, and that the income they 
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make from the process is therefore very significant (Ashenmiller) However, it also has become 
apparent through these interviews that these social services were unintended consequences of 
bottle deposit systems, structurally inferior to environmental and economic goals. Several recent 
changes in states systems are being conducted without much consideration of the needs of these 
kinds of users, especially the unhoused. This is discussed in greater detail later in this research. 
Waste and recycling is often the end step of the consumer cycle. Because of this, it is highly 
difficult to obtain accurate data and information about the details of the recycling and garbage 
industry, especially if these systems get linked into the international trade of waste (Minter, i). The 
recent book Junkyard Planet by Minter provides some limited insight into this ever-changing 
industry that’s controlled by the global market forces, but more up-to-date information is shared 
regularly by ISRI, the Institute for Scrap Recycling Industries Inc. Extraction of resources for 
manufacturing of materials such as PET plastic, aluminum, and glass can be a highly carbon and 
time-intensive process. Aluminum in particular requires the mining and extraction of bauxite, 
which is a mineral compound that is frequently removed with strip mining methods in many 
developing countries and then is smelted at the expense of the health and safety of workers, local 
people and the environment (Auty, 143; O’Connor, 75). While the pressure to export waste out of 
a developed country like the United States is powerful, it is also highly motivated by the reality of 
a powerful, magnetizing force of the market from places such as China. van Beukering writes 
about the growing demand for plastic products worldwide, and China’s consequent need to import 
existing plastics in order to supplement its insufficient domestic primary plastic production 
industry. This research will focus specifically on the impacts of the imported plastic recycling 




Comparative Research Methods 
 
My research is performed on the scale of analysis of the state for all stages of comparison. 
This more macro level of analysis is informed both by primary interviews, policy study, and 
relevant scholarly research. With ten bottle bill systems enacted in the country currently, this 
research is more intensive than extensive in its scope of study (Landman, 29). The four case studies 
were chosen in order to have the findings more grounded in its specific state context and to overall 
maintain a lower level of abstraction upon the research (Landman, 24).  
The dependent variable in this study is the political outcome of either the passage or defeat 
of bottle bill legislation. From there, the quality of its result is considered and compared between 
states through nine major independent variables and consideration of the state’s socio-political 
setting. This type of analysis is an empirical type of study, in which the research seeks to “establish 
causal relationships between two or more concepts to explain observed phenomena” (Landman, 
15). This is an inductive reasoning system that strives to explain results through the observation 
of known facts 
Comparative Research Design 
Throughout this analysis I use a two-tiered comparative analysis system, diagrammed in 
Figure 3.1. First, between the cases with “like” results (Oregon and Maine; Massachusetts and 
Washington), I employ Most Different Systems Design, or MDSD. This form of comparison is 
useful to explore the ways that independent variables influence how these quite contrasting pairs 
of states from opposite sides of the country arrive at either their eventual passage or rejection of a 
bottle bill system. This method of differential comparison “allows the researcher to distill out the 
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common elements from a diverse set of countries that have greater explanatory power” (Landman, 
29; Przeworski, 1970). The MDSD method is appropriate for this stage of my research because it 
allows me to explore which factors between case studies were most influential in bringing the 
states to the same ultimate conclusion of the dependent variable. It is for this reason that I paired 
up the states of Oregon and Maine which have passed comprehensive bottle bill legislation, to 
compare with the unfulfilled campaigns of Washington state’s attempts to pass a bottle bill in the 
1970’s, and 1982, and the failed Massachusetts water bottle expansion of Issue 2 in 2014 
(Spendelow, Ballotpedia). 
Over all of the case study states with existing bottle bills I will employ Most Similar 
Systems Design, or MSSD, to answer the question: why do similar state bottle bill laws on the 
same issue result in varying results and impacts? This MSSD comparative method is based off of 
J.S. Mill’s method of difference, and serves to identify key differentiating features among similar 
systems “which account for the [different] observed political outcome” (Landman, 29). Further, 
the geographic proximity of the pairs of Oregon and Washington, and Maine and Massachusetts, 
respectively, helps add to the underlying similarity upon which this comparative system is based. 
This MSSD technique will allow me to highlight specific differing results between case studies 
that relate back to the classifications and indicators that are explained throughout this chapter. 










Independent Variables for Comparison 
I impose several categories upon the bottle bill policies explored as case studies. These 
classifications will largely fall upon the mechanisms that are outlined in the bottle bill legislation 
itself. Figure 6.1, in Chapter 6 details most of the considered indicators. The variables and 
indicators used in this research include the system’s policy administration, sense of state 
environmental ethos, ownership of unredeemed deposit funds, handling fee price, method of 
passage, social services as a form of alternative income, deposit price, net oppositional funding 
against the bottle bill, strength of the supporting coalition, and the majority political party of the 
time. Several other variables that are considered in research cannot be explained or described so 
neatly into the cells of a table because they are more contextually based. These include the use of 
bottle deposit systems as a social service and alternative income method, as well as the unique 
situation of political and historical events that frame the way a state interacts with environmental 
policy. The details of the context-specific importance of these variables are discussed further on a 
case-by-case level in following chapters. 
Classification of the influencing indicators that lead to passage or defeat of bottle bill 
legislation is an important part of my methodology, but throughout this research I also compare 
the overall results of these policies, in order to understand which types of policies can bring about 
more or less effective trends in results. I will refer to these facts as either variables or indicators, 
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because they display certain information about the policy mechanisms and effectiveness within a 
state. These indicators may be either quantitative or qualitative.  
Administration of the Bottle Bill 
The first indicator is the administration and ownership of the system. This is an important 
consideration because the administrator of the system is the one who that has both the 
responsibility of and the power over the implementation the bottle bill system. While the 
administrator holds a large determining role in the effectiveness and inner workings of the bottle 
bill, it is also one that requires a substantial amount of funding to maintain the organization and its 
employees. This variable is considered in the MSSD section, because all of the bottle bill systems 
require very similar types of administration, and therefore allows for a consideration of the state’s 
comparative effectiveness bottle bill administration.  
Ownership of Unredeemed Deposits 
This research will consider whether the bottle deposit system is state-owned or industry 
owned. This research defines private as “any entity that is not a unit of government, including but 
not limited to a corporation, partnership, company, nonprofit organization or other legal entity or 
a natural person” and public as a government entity paid for by funds collected from the public 
(Oregon Laws).  Maine uses a state-owned system while Oregon uses a private, industry-owned 
system. A significant aspect of this ownership is that the owner also retains the unredeemed 
deposits from cans. As this is a figure in the millions of dollars, this is an important structural 
aspect of the bottle bill and can influence whether or not certain groups will support or oppose 
their initiative based on their access or exclusion from this pool of money. At the time of the 
legislation’s passage or attempted passage within the case studies explored here, states either 
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allocated their unredeemed deposits to the state for general uses, to the state for environmental 
uses, or to private industries who were the initiators of the deposit.  
Handling Fee 
 Another classification that differentiates the differing versions of bottle bill systems 
explored here is the presence or absence of a handling fee. This is significant because the presence 
of a handling fee puts an additional financial burden onto the beverage industry distributors, which 
further incentivizes these stakeholders to resist to the implementation or to the expansion of a 
bottle bill system. The case study states investigated here have handling fees that range from 0-4¢. 
Mode of Passage 
 This category differentiates between whether the legislation was proposed as a bill within 
the State Legislature or to the public on the ballot. Bills typically make their way through the state 
legislature with elected officials as its champions who facilitate shepherding it through the various 
committees, discussions, votes, and other bureaucratic steps until it is passed by a majority of both 
the House and Senate bodies of the state. The second option in many states is through the process 
of a Citizen’s Ballot Initiative. Any citizen who legally collects the requisite signatures and 
completes the appropriate paperwork within a specific timeline can initiate a ballot initiative. After 
the requirements are fully met and verified in all of the steps, a ballot initiative is put forward for 
a vote for either passage or rejection by the citizens of the state. This categorization is significant 





 The price of the deposit per container affects the rate of return of the container. At the time 
of the passage of the first bottle bill, the nickel deposit was the equivalent of 28¢ today 
(Spendelow). Consequently, return rates were also higher in the past when the real value of the 
nickel was higher than it is today. Therefore, the deposit price of containers is another variable 
category that is considered when comparing case study states because this directly influences the 
amount of container returned and the level of public participation in the program. Additionally, 
this factor continues to be an important consideration because some states are considering a future 
increase of their deposit price from a nickel to a dime. 
Bottle Bill Opposition and Funding  
 The presence and strength of political opposition can be a powerful determinant in the 
passage or defeat of bottle bill legislation. This analysis references the total quantitative spending 
records that display evidence of political opposition against the bottle bill, and I also utilize the net 
oppositional funding as a means of comparison. The net oppositional funding is the amount of 
money spent by opposition in anti-bottle bill efforts, as compared to the amount of money spent 
by the bill’s supporters. In these earlier bottle bill campaign, campaign funding was not as publicly 
recorded, and so in many cases there are estimated ranges based off of several sources’ spending 
records. This research will explore, and in some cases challenge the understanding that, “campaign 




Majority Political Party 
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 The relative power of a political party in the state government is particularly important 
when the bottle bill is considered through the state legislature. However, if the government is 
divided or does not perceive the political climate as favorable to pass a bottle bill, in some cases it 
can also recommend the bill to the state for a public vote, as it did in the case of Maine. Therefore, 
the makeup of the state legislature can be significant with either method of passage. As is discussed 
further in following chapters, the issue of environment has become polarized along party lines in 
recent years. This wasn’t always the case, as the research displays through its case study 
comparison. As bottle bill legislation is foremost considered to be a form of environmental policy, 
(although it also has many other aspects) a consideration of the majority party in power in state 
government can delineate the partisan or bipartisan levels of support for bottle bills. This can also 
offer insight into the ways that political parties compromise or divide over issues such as 
environmental policy.  
Strength of Supporting Coalition 
The size, variability, and tactics used by the supporting coalition for the bottle bill can hold 
large influence over whether or not bottle bill legislation passes in a state. This research 
describes this strength of support using quantitative data of the amount of funding that the group 
was able to raise.  Several forms of qualitative data are also referenced here, including a 
consideration of which groups make-up the coalition, whether or not the coalition is multi-
sectoral, their advertising and messaging tactics and volunteer participation 
State Environmental Ethos 
State environmental ethos is a difficult trait to qualify, as it depends largely upon personal 
experience and one’s own subjectivity. However, there are some indicator variables that suggest 
the presence of an environmental ethos, such as other pieces of environmental legislation and the 
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number and activity of local environmental nonprofits. As an Oregonian myself, I hold some 
deeper perceptions and understanding about the state culture there. However, I also recognize that 
this is also a personal bias, and it likely impacts the way that Oregon is represented in my research.  
In an attempt to understand the state environmental cultures in Maine, Massachusetts, and 
Washington I largely rely upon the information given to me by my interviewees in the state. I 
repeatedly heard references in Oregon and Maine to a strongly held cultural value for conservation 
of natural beauty and environmentalism as an influential factor in successfully passing container 
deposit legislation. I also reference secondary literature which considers the environmental culture 
present in U.S. states, who cite Oregon and Maine as states who hold a powerful “environmental 
imagination” (Judd, 2003; McCloskey, 2013). While this sense of an environmental ethos was not 
explicitly referenced in my interviews about Washington and Massachusetts and the bottle bill, the 
reasons for this omission are unknown. This does not mean that the culture of Washington and 
Massachusetts is to not value their environment. Instead, this shows that that something is different 
in the way that their bottle bill campaigns occurred within the context of their existing state 
environmental ethos. This aspect is elaborated upon more in following chapters within the MDSD 
analysis of the case studies. 
Semi-Structured Interview Format 
 Many of the sources that I use for this research are primary sources from interviews that I 
have conducted with people in the relevant political, economic, and activist spheres regarding this 
bottle bill research. These semi-structured interviews were conducted in-person, over the phone, 
or over email. Each interviewee has signed an IRB consent form prior to participating in an 
interview, were given access to example questions that may be included in their interview, and 
have the option of anonymity or to opt out of recording. These interviews are critical to my research 
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because they better inform my analysis of the more qualitative indicators, as well as more behind-
the-scenes information on campaigns and policy discussions. As Todd Landman writes, interviews 
can be used to, “uncover a deeper level of information in order to capture meaning, process and 
context (20). Additionally, there is a paucity of recent sources of research on the topic and these 
interviews served as great resources to investigate the current functioning of bottle bills in the case 
study states.  
Secondary Sources  
Newspaper articles and web sources are also valuable resources for my research. News 
articles can provide insight into the local understanding and the opinions of its bottle bill system. 
Articles were consulted from the local and state newspapers, for example, that describe the 
statewide preparations for the bottle deposit system and highlight opinions of local citizens and 
various stakeholders. Audio and video recordings of news reports and interviews are also very 
helpful, because they provide a second look into a person’s firsthand experience with the issue. 
These kinds of secondary sources offer valuable insight into the different stages of bottle bill 
campaigns and allowed me to study the international impact of the recycling market, as I wasn’t 
always able to interview people who were directly involved due to temporal, geographic, and 








Surpassing the Bottleneck: Bottle Bill Campaigns in Oregon and Maine 
 
 This chapter will use the Most Different Systems Design, MDSD, to examine the different 
variables that influenced the passage of Oregon and Maine’s bottle deposit legislation into law. 
This is a valuable method of comparison because it displays a wide variety of successful political 
techniques to pass environmental policy. This chapter will examine how the independent variables 
listed in Figure 6.1 of Chapter 6 such as a state environmental ethos, political opposition, activity 
of supporting coalitions (including political champions), support from the local business 
community, and the bill’s specific financial structuring influenced the ultimate passage of bottle 
deposit systems into law. 
Oregon 
Oregon was the first state in the country to pass container deposit legislation on the state 
level, and it did so through its State Legislature. The idea to ban disposable containers was 
originally suggested by Richard Chambers, who detested the rising amount of garbage that he 
came across during his kayaking and hiking expeditions that spanned nearly the entirety of the 
Oregon Coast (Walth, 255). Chambers reached out to friend, former fisherman, and State 
Representative Paul Hanneman, who ultimately scrounged up other politicians to co-sponsor the 
House Bill (HB) 1157 (Walth, 286). When the House Speaker found the legislation frivolous, it 
was sent to the State and Federal Affairs Committee (SFAC), which was a committee that was 
often said to serve as a “political graveyard” for legislation that the Speaker did not want to move 
forward. However, Representative Roger Martin of Lake Oswego was the SFAC chair at the time 
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and also one of the original co-sponsors of the bill. He gave the bottle bill a starting push by 
granting it a public hearing.  
The hearing was well-attended, and included many different types of testimony. An aide 
to then-Governor Tom McCall testified to the Governor’s support of the idea, and farmers and 
fishermen described the dramatic ways that litter was disrupting their work, property, livestock, 
and way of life. On the other side of the issue, industry representatives from paper, glass, metal, 
and beverage corporations cited evidence that beverage container made up a negligible portion of 
roadside garbage, “and union lobbyists stepped in to spin gloomy tales of job losses in the glass 
and metal industries if such a bill ever passed” (Walth, 261) The negative testimony left an impact, 
and Hanneman shortly suggested a compromise  that, “rather than ban returnables, the bill would 
require a five-cent deposit as an incentive to return bottles and cans” (288). This newly proposed 
system harkened back to the refillable container methods that bottling and brewing companies had 
used prior to the industry’s nationwide shift to single-use bottles and cans.  
This compromise kept HB 1157 alive but also its publicity from the hearing attracted 
industry opponents to more directly to fight against the bill (McCloskey, 84). Beverage industry 
lobbyists put heavy pressure through the committee SFAC Chairman Representative Martin to 
ensure that the committee would not have the votes to send the bottle bill to the House floor. 
Despite the industry pressure, Hanneman was able to convince a fellow outdoorsman Republican 
Representative Carroll Howe to flip the vote in favor of forwarding the bill to the floor for a vote. 
While the bill did not pass in the 1969 session, it had a hardy 23-37 showing in support. Hanneman 
tried to reach out to Governor McCall, who had publicly supported the idea previously but the 
Governor was silent on the issue except for rumor of a letter that circulated among state 
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Republicans that McCall did not want a bottle bill to pass that session due to the presence of a 
competing anti-littering initiative (Walth, 294).  
In the waiting period for the 1971 session, an interim committee was established to conduct 
preliminary studies and hearings on the issue of the bottle bill. This study would ultimately help 
lead to the creation of the inaugural bottle bill law, the Oregon Beverage Container Act. The bottle 
bill opponents still remained powerful and had ready access to resources and lobbyists, but the 
bill’s supporters were also more organized and unified this time around. Other strategic 
compromises were made such as the deposit price for small “stubby” beer bottles from breweries. 
Lobbying for both sides intensified to unprecedented levels and Governor McCall and others 
decried the oppositional campaign for its so-called, four D’s of “Distortion, Deceit, and Dollars, 
equaling Defeat” (McCloskey, 86). These aspects of the campaign are explored in greater depth 
later on, as the theme of these “four D’s” relate to all of the case studies investigated in the scope 
of this research. 
 The Beverage Container Act was passed into law in 1971 with votes to spare in the House 
of Representatives, but barely passed by the Oregon Senate with a vote of 16-14 in favor amid 
frenzied lobbying. As the country’s inaugural bottle bill, this landmark passage of the Oregon 
bottle bill sparked many other U.S. states to propose or refine their own forms of container deposit 
legislation. This section will focus in more detail upon the specific aspects that made Oregon’s 
bottle bill successfully pass into legislation with the intention of using similar variables to compare 
with Maine in the second part of this chapter.  
In Oregon specifically, the present ballot initiative process is recognized by many as one 
of the easiest states to get a proposal onto the public ballot. This is largely because of the state’s 
history of progressivism and early non-partisanship which supported putting issues of law to the 
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public (Oregon Blue Book). Oregon also holds the current record for the highest total state ballot 
initiatives attempted at 384 since the process was approved by the state legislature in 1902. 
However, passing legislation on the public ballot can be quite difficult, requiring highly specific 
strategies as are discussed in the case of Maine. The fact that the bottle bill was passed successfully 
through the Oregon State Legislature and not on through the state’s oft-used Ballot Initiative 
process appears due to several reasons. First, the consistent presence of strong champions that 
supported the bill was incredibly important. These champions were Richard Chambers, 
Representative Hanneman of Tillamook, and ultimately Governor McCall (Edwards, 54; Walth, 
282). These champions were often willing and able to convince other elected officials of the bottle 
bill, and were active advocates and coalition-builders both inside and outside of the capital (Walth, 
261). It must be noted that Hanneman, McCall, and Chambers all identified as Republicans as well 
as supporters of the bottle bill. The House of Representatives was controlled by Republicans at the 
time, and had Rep. Hanneman not been a Republican as well, it is likely that his efforts might not 
have been as well met (Hall).  
Oregon as a state holds a strong ethos of environmental protection, largely due to its 
historical dependence upon the timber and fishing industries. McCloskey poses that this sense of 
environmental ethos within Oregon might be because “the idea of conservation and reserves for 
that purpose are better understood in rural regions” (219). The 1970 census identified Oregon’s 
population as 32.93% rural, and since the state Senate equally represents all districts with two 
Senators, rural communities still maintained a large presence in the state government (U.S. Census 
Bureau). Senator and author Richard Neuberger held the belief that, “those who farmed and 
ranched the vast interior grasslands of the Pacific Northwest would never succumb to the mass 
ideologies that seemed to dictate global order in the 1930s and 1940s. Their opinions, he insisted, 
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reflected the ‘independence, freedom, and uniqueness of the majestic hinterland in which they 
live” (Judd, 2). Even the state motto, “She flies with her own wings” uses elements of nature to 
illustrate the “proud ability of Oregonians to be independent spirits” (Hall). 
Oregon as a “frontier state” fashioned a culture that was also highly dependent upon the 
land, and so incorporated ideas of environmental protection into its cultural ethos because its 
economy depends so much upon the land.5 The utopian novel Ecotopia by Ernest Callenbach 
recognizes this environmental identity of the Northwest bioregion in his reimagining of a seceded 
Northwest that centers upon a society that is structured upon environmental sustainability. Today, 
recreational hiking, hunting, fishing and boating are popular activities and the identity of Oregon 
as “the leading environmental state” continues to largely be upheld through state and local policy 
(McCloskey, xii). 
Coalition building was also critical to the eventual successful passage of the Oregon bottle 
bill. As broad as the issue is, the corresponding supporting coalition was consequently also quite 
diverse in nature, consisting of environmental groups, local grocery stores, breweries, and even 
the soda company Dr. Pepper (McCloskey, 85). Don Waggoner and the Oregon Environmental 
Council (OEC), which remains a powerhouse in state environmental politics today, created a 
subgroup within the organization titled “People Against Non-Returnables” (McCloskey, 84). This 
group performed research, gave testimony, and several other kinds of lobbying activities that were 
frequently successful in brokering game-changing compromises.  
                                               
5 It is essential to recognize the presence of Native peoples of Oregon, and truly in every case study that is examined 
in this study. The Chinook, Willamette, Umpqua, the Siletz and many more groups of indigenous peoples of Oregon 
intricately incorporated the details of the northwest bioregion into their culture and conducted boating, hiking, and 




The bottle bill also found unlikely allies in the shape of local grocers Fred Meyers and 
Plaid Pantry. John Piacentini, the owner of convenience stores Plaid Pantry, launched his own 
promotional bottle bill system in which he told people to return empty containers to any of his 
stores to receive a penny per container in exchange (Spendelow). In the first two weeks of the 
program the response was hugely positive, so much that the National Guard was called in to help 
remove the estimated 150,000 cans that were returned to Plaid Pantries across the state. This 
outpouring of support helped assuage the fears of grocery stores regarding the financial burden of 
processing the returned beverage containers. Oregon Department of Environmental Quality Solid 
Waste Analyst Peter Spendelow suggests that because these local stores like Fred Meyers and 
Plaid Pantry had an invested stake in the state of Oregon, they supported it, “because they 
understood the environmental aspects” and because they also as Oregonians wanted to reduce litter 
(Spendelow). 
Back in the state capitol of Salem, lobbying was intense on both sides of the bottle bill 
issue, and there were even “charges of attempted bribery” that arose (McCloskey, 86). The 
acknowledgment of this bill as a landmark opportunity with the potential to set a precedent 
throughout the country added further to the so-called “poisonous” climate surrounding the bill in 
the state government. Lobbyists for the metal industries offered $5,000 in campaign contributions 
for any senator who would vote against the bill (Walth, 296). In fact, it got to such high levels of 
hostility that the Attorney General and the American Organization for Industry (AOI) publicly 
decried the candor of the oppositional campaign (McCloskey, 86). 
The final product of the bottle bill was shaped through Hanneman’s and Waggoner’s 
willingness to compromise with the Oregon business community. The first major compromise 
occurred after the first Congressional hearing on the proposed bill, when the bill transformed from 
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the form of a ban on non-returnables to the deposit-scheme in response to industry concerns posed 
in testimony of the impact of a disposable bottle ban on jobs (Walth, 261). As Hanneman proposed 
this deposit amendment to the committee, he noted that “it was hardly radical, as it only required 
brewers and bottlers to operate as they had a few years before” (261). After all, the onset of 
throwaway containers was still relatively new and even smaller bottling companies still had the 
institutional memory to facilitate a refillable system.  
Hanneman and other advocates of the bottle bill recognized that the smaller companies in 
the brewing and soda industries were under a lot of stress due to heightened levels of competition 
to take advantage of the price advantages gained by using single-use containers. Breweries 
nationwide were forced to consolidate or go out of business, resulting in a loss of about 27,000 
jobs (Walth, 258). At the same time, Oregon was forming its culture of independent breweries in 
alongside the debate over the bottle bill, so it was essential and highly tactical to include these 
stakeholders in the conversation (Woodward; McCloskey, 85). The OEC met with Bill Wessinger 
of the Blitz-Weinhard brewery and agreed on a compromise of a reduced deposit price of two cents 
on small “stubby” brown beer bottles in exchange for his support of the bottle bill. This addendum 
also had the result of standardizing the size of all Oregon-based beer bottles to these 11oz bottles 
for which “all the brewer had to do was put the bottle through a washing machine, wash off the 
existing labels on that, fill it with beer, slap their own label on it and then send them off” 
(Spendelow). This “brewer’s exemption” and its efficiency-promoting standardization of bottles 
helped discredit the opposition’s argument that the bottle bill is “anti-business,” an argument still 
commonly made today.  
 Another critical part of the reason why Oregon’s Beverage Container Recovery Act passed 
in 1971 is that it was specifically crafted to be privately-owned and not involve any public money. 
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Initially this meant that bottlers and distributors joined together into several cooperative groups to 
administrate the bottle bill, but now all of the distributors have joined together to form a single 
cooperative corporation with a 99% membership rate for Oregon bottlers and distributors (OBRC, 
Bertges).  
Oregon also never proposed a handling fee as a part of its container deposit legislation. The 
absence of additional costs per container made the law less economically threatening for 
distributors, bottling companies, and pickup agencies. Ultimately, this was made possible because 
the funds from unredeemed containers, a fund of around $16 million dollars per year, is almost 
entirely owned by the distributors themselves6 (Bottle Bill Task Force Report, 14). “Whatever 
profits the co-op generates are divided among the 80 beverage distributors that own the Oregon 
Beverage Recycling Cooperative” (Thomas). While, as will continue to be discussed, it is unduly 
apparent that there was a presence of strong opposition against the Oregon bottle bill, it can be 
argued that the fight for passage would have been even more highly contested if the law was 
constructed to include more out-of-pocket costs for businesses in the beverage industry. Though it 
can never be known for sure, this slightly more pro-business structure may have made the 
difference, as the vote in the Senate was as close as it possibly could be and still be in favor of 
passage, 16-14. 
 Overall, Oregon’s bottle bill was successfully passed into law in 1971 due to a combination 
of the presence of committed legislative champions across party lines, a powerful state 
environmental ethos, a strong coalition of supporters--including local businesses, and through 
repeated considerations, consultations and compromises with stakeholder in the beverage business 
                                               
6 Some funds are allocated to the Oregon Liquor Control Commission for their partial administrative role  
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community. This research now looks to the state of Maine to compare the different ways that a 
state can successfully pass container deposit legislation. 
Maine 
 Maine was the third state in the U.S. to pass container deposit legislation, following Oregon 
and Vermont. The originally proposed legislation LD 931/1888, An Act to Require Returnable 
Beverage Containers, was put forward in the regular legislative session of 1975, but was rejected 
in the House of Representatives (Legislative History, 2013). As is discussed later on, there was a 
significant amount of lobbying on this issue, particularly in opposition to the bill.  
The topic was posed again in the 1976 Special Legislative Session, largely thanks to a Joint 
Order from the Natural Resources Committee requiring a study of solid waste (House 3/24/76, 
641). It was cited that of this thirteen-person Committee, eleven “felt that a returnable beverage 
container provision should be included in a comprehensive solid waste bill” (Senate, 3/26/76, 742). 
Such a bill was proposed in the Maine House of Representatives in the form of H.P. 2090/L.D. 
2249, “An Act to Improve Solid Waste Management” (House, 3/24/76, 641). It went through a 
series of amendments crafted by both the Committee on Taxation and the Maine Senate, and there 
was significant debate about whether a bottle bill should be included in the act--especially after it 
was only slightly adjusted after it the Senate rejected it in the previous session (Legislative 
History).  
It was suggested on March 24, 1976 by proponent of the bill Representative McKernan of 
Bangor that the proposed bottle deposit system “is an opportunity to allow the people to vote on 
something that they are very concerned about and that they favor” (House, 3/24/76, 641). This 
sentiment was echoed in the Senate by Senator Collins of Knox in a floor statement that, “this 
[referendum provision] not only has a value involving a judgement but a value in educating our 
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citizens to the importance of solid waste management” (Senate, 3/26/76, 746). While this action 
was framed by the state government as an attempt to include the public in state politics, many 
aspects suggest that due to intense lobbying the Maine Legislature decided to “kick the can further 
down the road” in order to pass on the bottle bill as someone else’s problem (ME Audubon - Ginn). 
Eventually, HB 2090 was approved by the Maine Legislature on April 1st and 2nd, 1976, 
with the specific provision for the bottle bill system to be determined by the people of Maine 
through a public referendum. The House voted 36-103 in favor of passing the bill and forwarding 
it to the Senate, where it then passed easily and was sent on to the Governor’s office with an 
approving vote of 26-4 (House, 4/1/76, 890; Senate, 4/2/76, 925). Then, just the section of the bill 
regarding the potential for the creation of bottle bill system was put forward to the voters, who 
widely approved it on Election Day 1976 (Ballotpedia, Maine Minimum Bottle Refund). The 
Maine bottle bill system was implemented on June 1, 1978, and its original process is outlined in 
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Figure 4.1 displays the cycle of Maine’s deposit system, and illuminates the roles or 
burdens that each stakeholder or groups takes on throughout the process. One aspect that this 
diagram fails to include is that not all recycled material stays in the region and neatly goes back to 
the distributor who initially sold it to the recycler. Rather, once the glass, plastic, or aluminum is 
sold to the recycler, those materials are sold for reuse to the highest bidder. In some cases, this 
may include exporting the product internationally.  
Like Oregon, Maine also has a powerful environmental ethos rooted deeply within its 
culture as a state. After the Second World War, Maine’s economy fell behind the rest of the 
nation’s, as it was fairly marginalized from the rest of the country and depended largely upon its 
local economy (Judd, xii). This attributed to a growing sense of individualism in Maine that was 
largely rooted in the land. One poet describes a vision in which Maine was separated from the rest 
of the country by “blow[ing] up the bridges to the mainland...and return to the free life, the life 
without fences” (Judd, 1).  
However, the state’s burgeoning tourism industry indirectly allowed for the incorporation 
of these environmental ideals into the politics of the state of Maine through support of local 
beautification ordinances and a “Keep Maine Scenic” government program (16). Current Maine 
Senator and former Governor Angus King who was a lobbyist for the National Resource Council 
of Maine during the passage of the bottle bill says that, “As a tourist-oriented state whose major 
attraction is its natural beauty, we are very aware of the contribution of the deposit system in 
keeping our roadsides clean. The deposit law has had a positive effect in fostering over 1,600 jobs 
with annual wages of $22.8 million at local redemption centers throughout the state” 
(Bottlebill.org). 
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  More anecdotally, in an interview Maine native Sarah Lakeman also expressed that the 
bottle bill is seeded deeply into the state’s culture and that if in her work at an environmental non-
profit “You mention, hey, they’re trying to mess with the bottle bill and everyone’s like no way 
it’s not going to happen. It’s a part of our culture here I think people just are proud of it, and it’s 
what we do and...it would be really hard to go against that” (Lakeman). Further, Beth Milligan 
mentioned that upon moving to Maine from elsewhere that she noticed, “there’s a lot of hunters, 
there’s a lot of fisherman, they like to snowmobile...There’s a really deep appreciation for the 
outdoors...and I think that’s the culture and it’s a generational thing that’s passed down.”  
 In Maine, there is a popular public ballot system for citizens to directly vote bills into law. 
As was outlined earlier, this bill went through a combination of both of the two political options 
for passing legislation because it was first passed by the Maine Legislature specifically to be posed 
as a referendum to the people. The Maine Returnable Container Beverage Law passed with 57.8% 
of the vote for and 42.2% against on November 2, 1976.  
Proposed legislation on the public ballot is often more present in the public consciousness 
than bills in the State Legislature, because there is a necessity to get the state’s citizens to care, 
about the issues, decide their opinion on it, and physically get themselves out to vote (Ellis, 2002). 
In fact, Senator Berry from Cumberland states during a Senate discussion that, “by the time this 
plebiscite takes place everybody in the State of Maine is going to be so well informed on all the 
features of the thing that they will know more about the bill than we do now when we vote on it” 
(Senate 3/29/76, 791).  
This sense of public political discussion leaves more work for the interest groups involved 
in campaigns as they strive to reach the wider public rather than the several hundred elected 
officials who can all be found predictably within the state capitol. However, with campaigns comes 
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a necessity for fundraising, and studies often show that whichever side has the most money in a 
political campaign will come out the victor due to their superior access to lobbyists, advertising, 
and hired campaign staff (Gourevitch, 57; McCuan, 52). Maine, may prove an exception to this 
rule, as is discussed later in the chapter. 
By 1976 two bottle bills had already been passed and one in Washington had been defeated. 
Both supporters and opponents of the Maine Returnable Container Beverage Law could then 
reference and learn from these experiences to help frame their efforts in Maine. The coalition 
opponents of the Maine bottle referendum in 1976 consisted of brewers, bottlers, canners, material 
industries, soft-drink companies, and container manufacturers (AP, 1978; Bowers). 
 The presence and level of political opposition is a significant factor in whether legislation 
passes, or does not pass. In 1975 during the first consideration of container deposit legislation in 
the state of Maine, Senator Reeves of Kennebec cited that just the television and newspaper 
advertising for the bottle bill opposition amounted to “some fifteen to twenty thousand dollars” in 
an attempt to sway just the votes of Maine’s elected officials (Senate, 3/22/76, 575). During the 
1976 Special Legislative Session, the level of oppositional spending is unclear. However, the 
records of governmental sessions include an accusatory statement from Senator Collins toward 
Senator Katz, who had suddenly changed his vote to oppose the bottle bill. Collins charged that 
Katz was now in the pocket of the anti-bottle bill coalition when he said, “it is obvious that the 
lobby for the liquor industry and the soft drink industry has been diligently at work overnight” 
(Senate, 3/30/76, 824). These examples display the intensity of the anti-bottle bill coalition. 
In the five months following the legislative referral of the law to the public these opponents 
launched an all-out attack against the referendum. The figures for the funding vary slightly, but 
most estimate that these opponents spent between $350,000-$500,000 on their anti-bottle bill 
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campaign (ME Audubon - Bill Ginn; Bowers). Typically, this wielding of such a heavy financial 
weapon can deal a fatal blow to a container deposit system campaign. However, evidence shows 
that in Maine this attempt may have backfired. Due to the state’s small population of just over one 
million in 1976, the anti-bottle bill techniques of the opposing coalition have been described as a 
“complete saturation,” with advertisements on all types of media, billboards, bumper stickers, and 
pamphlets everywhere (Bowers).  
As a state with a small population and with five other issues on the ballot that fall, William 
Ginn of the Maine Audubon Society says that despite the bitterness of the political battle, “It was 
overkill...People got fed up with this show of muscle” (Ginn, 2005; Bowers).  This feeds back into 
Maine’s cultural individualism of practicality, love for the outdoors, and a dislike of being pushed 
around by big money (ME Audubon - Bill Ginn). A study of Maine campaigns and elections notes 
that in many instances “in Maine ballot measure campaigns, having more resources than your 
opponent is not a guarantor of victory...it’s not the independent variable it’s cracked up to be” 
(Potholm, 158). Even today, Ginn notes, Maine is an anomaly in the nation as data shows that 
“Mainers” tend to vote by “conscience” more frequently than it votes for the side with more 
money” (ME Audubon - Bill Ginn). The coalition in support of the bottle bill spent somewhere 
between $29,000 and $40,000 on their campaign, which was about ten times less than what the 
anti-bottle bill coalition spent (ME Audubon - Bill Ginn, Bowers).  
While the overwhelming nature of the anti-bottle coalition seems to have resulted in 
overwhelming and frustrating many Maine voters, a lot of credit also has to be given to the 
supporting coalition and its leaders. This group consolidated themselves under the name,  
“Maine Citizens for Returnable Containers” and was largely made up of environmental groups, 
including Maine Audubon, the Natural Resource Council of Maine (NRCM), and the Keep Maine 
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Scenic Committee (Maine’s Bottle Bill, 5). Additionally, the bottle bill received support from local 
politicians, both Democrat and Republican who were campaigning at the time (AP, 1976). 
This larger coalition of supporters was quite effective in organizing large amounts of 
volunteers, and in many ways conducted a type of grassroots organizing effort before that term 
entered popular political dialogue. Ginn says that this coalition, “fielded as much money in the 
forms of volunteers out on the sides of roads as our opposition did with their financing and their 
slick ads.” He credits the referendum’s large margin of victory to this “extraordinary volunteer 
effort” (ME Audubon - Bill Ginn). It also seems that Ginn himself, then the assistant director of 
Maine Audubon, was also very active. Sometimes speaking with to five audiences a day, Ginn 
travelled more than 7,000 miles around the state in the fall of 1976 (Adams, 2015). The presence 
of committed organizers and a large-scale mobilization of passionate volunteers were a large factor 
in passing the Maine bottle bill initiative.  
An important factor in a container deposit system is the means of collecting payment to 
cover the costs of the system’s procedures. In the case of Maine, the costs for running a redemption 
center are covered by a handling fee, which must be paid by the distributors who initiate the 
deposit. These distributor groups are often household beverage company brands, including Coca-
Cola, Pepsi, Gatorade and Nestlé. Unsurprisingly, these groups are very opposed to the presence 
of a handling fee because they are working on large scales of collection, in which a one-cent 
handling fee on average resulted in a $310 fee per ton in 1977 (Resource Conservation Committee, 
159).  
Since the original passage of the legislation, the handling fee has been increased from 1¢ 
in 1976 to 3.5¢ or 4¢7 today (BottleBill.org). This increasing price continues to be a thorn in the 
                                               
7 If part of the co-mingling agreement 
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side of beverage distributors, but pits them against the small business owners who run any of the 
800 container redemption centers across the state who depend upon the handling fee to cover their 
costs (Lakeman). As local businesses employing around 1,000 people, the redemption center sector 
has a vested interest in protecting and increasing the handling fee, as business costs increase over 
time. The redemption center owners also still remain highly involved in efforts to defend the bottle 
bill from attacks from the opposition, as happened in 2014 (Lakeman). 
At the time of the original bottle bill’s passage in 1976 the language of the legislation 
awarded the deposits to the “sole initiators of the deposits,” the distributors (Criner, 21). 
Distributors also typically pass on the additional handling fee to the consumers through the product 
price. Therefore, if containers are unredeemed and thus do not require handling, distributors at this 
time could gain a six-cent profit per container. Unredeemed deposits were very profitable for the 
distributors under the original bottle bill, a reality which contrastingly conflicts with the underlying 
goal of a high return rate for containers. 
Partially because of this counterproductive incentive, Maine changed the final ownership 
of unredeemed container deposits. It is currently the case that if containers included under the 
bottle bill go unredeemed, the 5¢ or 15¢ profit either returns to the state into the Maine General 
Fund, or to the bottle manufacturers who are part of a “comingling agreement,” which was 
established later on, in 2003. Comingling is defined by the Maine Department of Agriculture to be 
when, "two or more initiators of deposit (distributors) of beverage containers for which they have 
initiated deposits to be commingled by dealers and redemption centers. The advantages of 
comingling agreements allow for the comingling of beverage containers by like product group, 
(beer, wine, spirits and soft drinks etc.) material, and size” (Maine Dept. of Agriculture, 4). This 
agreement encourages comingling, which allows for more high quality recyclable material to be 
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sold to the recycling industry, but also creates greater uncertainty in the deposit amount returned 
for each distributor. 
Sarah Lakeman of the NRCM noted that the large amount of money collected from 
unredeemed deposits in the state of Maine today is largely “new news” to the state’s current group 
of legislators. Lakeman said that she didn’t “think they [Maine’s elected officials] realized how 
much money was essentially going to the state” from the unredeemed deposits, which in 2014 
amounted to about $1.8 million dollars. Manufacturers who are members of the co-mingling 
agreement are not presently required to report how much money they receive from unredeemed 
deposits under the bottle bill, but it is estimated to be at least double the amount that the state 
receives, approximately $3.6 million (Lakeman). This is an internally built-in compromise that 
provides monetary benefits to some manufacturing groups, who would otherwise likely be a 
staunch opponent. 
 The fact that the bottle bill in Maine’s bottle bill began in the legislature and was referred 
to the public through referendum greatly changed which tactics were most critical in passing the 
proposed legislation into law. In Maine, there is also a strong, pre-existing environmental ethos 
that greatly supported the ideas of litter-reduction--especially as a state whose growing tourism 
industry depends upon its rural, and rustic beauty. Maine holds a unique cultural value for 
individualism due to its post-war economic isolation and heavily rural population (US Census, 
1970). This sense of individualism remained strong in the face of big money contributions from 
bottle bill opponents and ultimately led to a significant victory of the Maine Returnable Beverage 




Comparing Oregon and Maine  
Oregon and Maine both hold strong core environmental values as a part of their state 
cultures. This common disgust with the new phenomenon of litter in rural and beach communities 
who are dependent on agriculture and tourism created the initial support needed for container 
deposit legislation to be feasible. The two states on different sides of the country then split off into 
two paths that exemplify different ways to pass bottle bill legislation.  
Bottle bill initiatives in both states were met with significant political opposition from a 
well-funded coalition of beverage-related industries and grocers. However, bottle bill advocates in 
Oregon and Maine approached this obstacle in different ways. Oregon’s strong political champions 
in the State Legislature worked with supporting activists to broker compromises with key players 
within the beverage industry, most notably local brewers. The oft-made argument that container 
deposit legislation is “anti-business” was softened in the case of Oregon because of these efforts 
to compromise with the local business community, and due to the unwavering support from several 
other local businesses whose leaders personally approved of the environmental goals of the bottle 
bill. In Maine, the setting of the bottle bill legislation on the public referendum required different 
techniques. The supporting coalition was largely made up of Maine environmental groups, and 
under their leadership they organized a mass mobilization of volunteers and an outreach to all parts 
of the sparsely populated state. Underpinning this success was Maine’s culturally-rooted distrust 
of “big money” and consequent frustration with the incessant harassment from bottle bill 
opposition. 
 Certain structural aspects of these two bottle bill legislations were also important in 
allowing their passage into law. In Oregon, the absence of a handling fee and the ultimate 
ownership of the unredeemed deposits by the distributors was a critical point of compromise to 
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the beverage industry. Any inclusion of additional costs to the beverage industry and 
manufacturers likely would have increased oppositional lobbying, and since the bill only passed 
the Senate 16-14, any further lobbying might have resulted in the defeat of the bottle bill. Maine’s 
original one-cent handling fee was highly opposed by the opposing coalition, and it was argued 
that this handling fee was detrimental to businesses--including “Mom ‘n Pop” local stores (House 
3/24/1976, 624). However, the argument that the bottle bill was anti-business was largely 
overshadowed by the perceived opportunity posed through establishing redemption centers in the 
state. This created a new local jobs sector and it was generally accepted that the handling fee was 
the necessary means to pay for these systems.  
These are not the only ways to successfully pass bottle bill legislation at the state level, as 
the presence of eight other bottle deposit systems around the country clearly demonstrate. 
However, these case studies from opposite coasts do exemplify the critical aspects that have the 
potential to influence a successful passage of container deposit legislation. Next, this research 
explores two case studies of defeated bottle bills in order to discover pivotal aspects that encourage 










How to Beat a Bottle Bill: Comparative Case Studies of Washington and Massachusetts 
  
This chapter will use the MDSD comparative methodology to investigate how and why 
these two states failed to pass bottle deposit legislation. This chapter will explain how the specific 
situations and variables facing Massachusetts and Washington created incompatible settings for 
deposit systems to pass into law.  The major variables in consideration in these case studies include 
the handling fee, anti-bottle bill oppositional messaging and tactics, the attempted method of 
passage onto the public ballot, and the simultaneous presence of alternative litter-reduction 
systems. These variables are significant because identification of the tactics that have defeated 
bottle bills in the past can help frame future attempts at passing forms of environmental policy 
when facing similar barriers. 
This will consider Washington’s three attempts in 1970, 1979, and 1982 at passing a bottle 
bill in conjunction. This combination is because in these three attempted ballot initiatives build off 
of each other in many ways, experience similar barriers to legislative passage, and lead to the 
ultimate inability to pass container deposit legislation in the state. The Massachusetts case study 
addresses the existing bottle bill system as important contextual information, but the focus of the 
section is on the 2014 Question 2 campaign. This was a ballot initiative campaign to expand the 
bottle bill to add other updates to the state’s bottle deposit system.  
         As was displayed in Figure 2.1, bottle bills as ballot initiatives versus bottle bills proposed 
in the legislature have very different levels of success. Here, both Washington and Massachusetts 
attempted to use the ballot as the method to pass bottle bill legislation. However, unique challenges 
face ballot initiatives that do not also face legislatively proposed bills. Direct democratic initiatives 
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have fewer structurally incorporated protections to protect from outside interference with the 
democratic process than the structure of legislative lawmaking (McCuan, 53) The United States 
political system is dependent upon checks and balances, and some argue that the design of direct 
democracy is in many ways a power limitation upon representative government. However, since 
the professionalization of politics through the use of pollsters, paid canvassers, and media 
consultants has recently become normalized, it is now questionable how accessible the path of 
direct democracy is for the average citizen (McCuan,52). 
Oregon, as laid out in the previous chapter, did not face these exact kinds of challenges. 
This is largely because working through the state legislature is often more removed from the public 
eye, and because the process of committees drafting and editing legislation allows for increased 
opportunities to develop supporting champions through politically-achieved compromises. 
However, Maine did experience similar kinds of challenges when the bottle bill was on the ballot 
there. 
Washington 
Robert H. Keller, Jr was a History and Indian Law and Policy professor at Western 
Washington University in Bellingham, WA in 1969. A class project in his class was to reduce litter 
in a local park, and his students struggled to accomplish their litter reduction goals with signage, 
punitive fines, or volunteer clean-ups. Together, Professor Keller and his students referenced a 
previous petition and the Oregon proposal to collect signatures and submit an Initiative to the 
People to propose a statewide deposit on beverage containers on the public ballot (Schmidt, 2010). 
Initiative 256, Washington Ban on Non-Refundable Beverage Containers, was put to the 
people on the 1970 public ballot. This is before the first bottle bill in Oregon was passed, so this 
first initiative was largely in uncharted territories. It failed by a margin of 51.28% against with 
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48.725% in support (Ballotpedia, Initiative 256). After this loss at the ballot the Washington State 
University newspaper commented that its defeat, “reflects the apparent apathy and lack of concern 
for natural resources on the part of the voters” (Williams, 1970). Just a few months later, Oregon 
passed the nation’s inaugural bottle bill. Inspired by this new market-incentivized form of 
environmental legislation, states across the country began proposing – with many passing – their 
own versions of bottle deposit legislations. In 1971 the Washington State Legislature, however, 
passed the, “Waste Reduction, Recycling, and Model Litter Control Act” as “an alternative to 
beverage container deposits” (Litter Laws, WA Gov). This law was ratified by Washington voters 
in 1972 to study litter patterns, create a task force on the issue, and to enforce litter penalties.  
With several successful campaigns across the U.S., bottle bill proponents prepared to 
present a second bottle bill on the Washington ballot in 1979. However, this proposal was defeated 
by an even greater margin than before, with 57.28% opposed and only 42.37% in support. By the 
time that a deposit system was proposed again in 1982, it was easily beaten with more than 70% 
in opposition to the initiative. This period of the 1980s was also highly anti-regulatory at many 
levels of government and the beverage industry implemented a “Vote No” campaign against bottle 
bills that largely stifled the spread of the legislation across the nation (Schmidt, 103). Just four of 
eleven bottle bill initiatives passed into law during the Reagan administration. 
Figure 2.1 displays that several states have tried to pass deposit laws multiple times. 
However, only Massachusetts and California have been successful, while Colorado and 
Washington have found it impossible to pass bottle bill legislation in later attempts.  In 1982 the 
Washington D.C. group Environmental Action tried to coordinate bottle bill initiative campaigns 
that were on their second or third try for passage, largely unsuccessfully (Schmidt, 101). 
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While an exploration of why certain states are able to pass bottle bills into law after the 
first attempt and others weren’t entails a different research project, it does show that it is difficult 
to pass bottle bill legislation on the second attempt. Therefore, the fact that Washington attempted 
not twice but thrice to pass bottle bill legislation displays the declining chances of the bill’s 
passage. The initiative results over time also display a corresponding decrease in the public’s 
favorability for the bottle bill in Washington state. Between 1970 and 1979 support for the bottle 
bill fell almost 6% and dropped nearly 13% between 1979 and 1982.  
Triumph of Innovation: The Supporting and Opposing Coalitions 
 Professor Keller’s class completed the final proposal in mid-April of 1970, which is 
typically too late to begin a campaign for a ballot in a November election. However, David Schmidt 
writes that Keller’s students were excited and impatient to work on the campaign and Professor 
Keller agreed to submit the initiative petition on their behalf despite the unideal timing (96). 
Though the coalition was substantial and included the Washington Environmental Council, The 
Sierra Club, and even local banks who conducted bottle collection demonstrations8, this campaign 
was still left with just six months to convince the public to support the bottle bill. However, the 
proponents still garnered significant support because of the national environmental energy that 
was sweeping the country. The coalition collected 188,102 signatures over eight weeks, which was 
the record number of petition signatures ever gathered in Washington at the time (Schmidt, 97). 
Interestingly, there was not a huge expectation of significant opposition from the beverage 
industry against bottle bills, because these companies too were riding high on the environmental 
movement’s popularity and tailored marketing tactics to include ideas of recycling and reuse. 
Therefore, it was a relatively easy transition for the proponents of the Washington Bottle Bill to 
                                               
8 These instances were similar to the case of Plaid Pantry in Oregon. 
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build off of these sentiments and ask questions directly from the environmental pamphlets of 
beverage companies such as Coca-Cola’s rhetorical question, “Wouldn’t you rather borrow [a] 
bottle than buy it” (Schmidt, 97). However, as shall be discussed, the beverage industries were not 
passive in the issue of bottle bills. 
Although there was a poll less than a month before the election that said that voters 
supported the initiative by 76%, ultimately the supporting groups were outflanked by a superior 
messaging tactic (Schmidt, 99). Using a “carrot and stick” approach, the industry presented an 
alternative litter law just two months before the election, and also spread the message that a bottle 
bill would be bad for local businesses and increase unemployment. As Keller and his supporters 
went to lobby the unions on the premise that a bottle bill creates more jobs than a throwaway 
system, “they found that the industry had gotten to the unions first and convinced the retail clerks 
that they would be forced into an unwanted role as garbage collectors, that beverage sales would 
plummet, that producers and distributors of drinks in throwaway containers would be forced to 
shut down, and that unemployment would worsen” (Schmidt, 98). Several of these arguments are 
incorrect or exaggerated, but they still had the intended effect of decreasing support for the bottle 
bill. 
These distributors, corporations, and grocers then successfully rebranded themselves as a 
Pro-Litter Law coalition rather than an anti-bottle bill coalition. The following year, a version of 
this law passed in the Washington State Legislature. This legislation is more favorable to bottlers, 
distributors, beverage companies, and grocers because it focuses on implementing litter fines, fees, 
and other methods at the consumer or “litter-er” instead of at the level of industry.  Additionally, 
the minimal taxes that are paid by the beverage industry to fund this program just make up 2% of 
the taxes, while many other industries are required to pay far larger contributions. 
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         The argument for a Litter Law is that it reduces required actions from consumers and 
industry, addresses total litter rather than just beverage containers, and is not economically 
disruptive. In response, bottle bill supporters often point out that Litter Law proponents are 
typically deeply involved with those whose profits would suffer under a bottle bill, as shown by 
the testimony delivered at a Congressional Hearing. Nearly all of those who mentioned the 
Washington Litter Law favorably in their testimony were themselves members of the beverage 
industry in some way (Beverage Container Reuse and Recycling Hearings). Additionally, there is 
a great amount of discussion about the comparative level of effectiveness between Litter Laws 
such as Washington’s and bottle deposit systems. Proponents of the Model Litter Law maintain 
that studies show the law cut litter by 66%, but bottle bill proponents have been skeptical of the 
validity of this figure because of controversy over the starting amount of litter and the methods of 
counting--by piece or by volume. (Beverage Container Reuse and Recycling Hearings). Seven 
years after the passage of Washington’s Model Litter Law the former Governor was quoted calling 
roadside litter, “a disgrace. The worst I've ever seen it” (Litter Taxes). 
         The opposition to the proposed bottle bills on the Washington state ballot initially began at 
a high level and continued to increase over the years. The opposition is primarily made up of 
beverage corporations, distributors and the grocers. These groups oppose the bottle bill because it 
adds additional responsibilities, and consequent additional costs to their companies through the 
required compliance with a state bottle bill system (Spendelow). 
         The oppositional tactics to the proposed bottle bills in Washington were made possible by 
their large pool of anti-bottle bill funding. The anti-bottle bill coalition hired one of the most 
renowned Seattle political advertising firms to consult on how to beat the initiative. With this 
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professional advice, the oppositional coalition launched an intense advertising effort against 
Initiative 256 (Keller, 1970).  
This coalition was especially effective in Washington’s later campaigns because they had 
time to refine and adjust their techniques (Schmidt, 101). It is estimated that in 1979 and 1989, 
respectively, the opposition spent $856,000 and $717,951 to fight against the Washington bottle 
bill (Bottle Bill Initiative Spending Records). Peter Spendelow worked on the bottle bill campaign 
in 1979 and 1982 and notes that, “the industry was very good at picking an issue and creating their 
own narrative and with lots of money they could get that narrative out.” In the case of Washington, 
this money was also used to fund highly effective and original oppositional techniques. 
In Washington where grocers were almost universally aligned with the beverage industry 
to oppose the bottle bill, the grocery store was a very valuable location to spread the anti-bottle 
bill message. Spendelow describes that the anti-bottle bill coalition attached small tags to each six-
pack of cans or bottles that said, “if measure 61 passes, this six-pack will cost you 55¢ more.” 
While this information is incorrect, it was ultimately effective in confusing the consumers about 
the pricing and functioning of the proposed system. Additionally, stores printed “‘Vote No’ 
messages on grocery bags, had clerks put ‘Vote No’ leaflets into them, and set up ‘Vote No’ 
advertising displays in stores (Schmidt, 101). These types of techniques were very effective 
because they were placed in high-traffic locations that directly related to the issue on the ballot. 
In Washington state there is some sense of a state culture of environmentalism, especially 
regarding land conservation efforts and the outdoor tourism industry (Catton, 1997). However, it 
is significant to note that here this sense of state ethos was not powerful enough to overcome the 
anti-bottle bill coalition as it was in the cases of Oregon and Maine. In Washington, it was not just 
opponent spending and advertising that were going against the bottle bill, but also the inappropriate 
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timing of the supporting coalition, compounding presence of alternative legislation, and the 
multiple attempts to pass the bill on the public ballot that made it essentially impossible to pass 
container deposit legislation in the state. Further, as time passed after the first attempt to pass a 
bottle bill in 1970 the industry refined its oppositional tactics and became increasingly more 
effective. A comparison of the case studies of Washington and Massachusetts will continue to 
expand on the different ways that bottle deposit legislation can be defeated on the public ballot. 
Massachusetts 
         The original bottle bill passed in Massachusetts in 1982 after one failed attempt in 1976. It 
was ultimately passed the second time from the State Legislature’s override of the Governor’s 
veto. These were highly contested campaigns, including heavy lobbying and unprecedented 
spending budgets (Adams, 2014). This law covered carbonated soft drinks, mineral water, malt, 
and beer with a five-cent deposit and originally included a two-cent handling fee. The handling 
fee was first increased from 1 to 2.25¢ in 2010. The Massachusetts system awards ownership of 
unredeemed deposits to the State’s General Fund under the Commonwealth’s existing “escheat 
law,” or reversion of property the state. The uses for this fund are vast, but include the basic 
functioning of government from employee payroll to funding for repairs and structural 
maintenance (UMAS). 
In 2014, the executive Director of Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group 
(MASSPIRG) Janet Domenitz filed a proposed expansion to the Massachusetts bottle bill to 
include non-carbonated beverage containers in the state’s deposit system, increase the handling 
fee, and would send the unredeemed deposits into a Clean Environment Fund. These non-
carbonated, non-alcoholic drinks include plastic water bottles, sports, and energy drinks, which 
now make up a large percentage of the waste and litter stream. However, only 23% of these types 
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of containers get recycled in the absence of an inclusive bottle bill, as compared with the 80% 
recycling rate of containers that are covered by the deposit system (MASSPIRG). The details in 
this proposed expansion were heavily opposed by the many members of the beverage and grocery 
industries in Massachusetts. This opposition is outlined throughout this chapter within the context 
of the current United States campaign finance system, with special attention to the implications of 
the 2010 Supreme Court case Citizens United v FEC. 
The push for an expanded and updated bottle bill is not unique to Massachusetts. By the 
time that Massachusetts was considering Question 2 on the ballot, several other states including 
Oregon and Maine had expanded the scope of their deposit systems, increased handling fee levels 
where present, and even passed legislation to increase the deposit fee to a dime (Bottle Bill Task 
Force). The reasoning behind these updates and edits to the bottle bill is mostly to increase the 
amount recycled, redemption rate and economic stability of the deposit systems. A source noted 
that she believed even the current handling fee should be increased, because it is already difficult 
for redemption center owners to make ends meet for these small businesses (Lakeman). 
Supporting and Opposing Coalitions to Question 2 
In the specific case of Massachusetts, members of the supporting coalition for Question 2 
included the state’s Sierra Club, MASSPIRG, the League of Women Voters, Audubon Society, 
the Environmental League of Massachusetts, and others. Overall, these groups came together in 
two formal coalitions: ‘Coalition for an Updated Bottle Bill’ and ‘Update the Bottle Bill.’ Several 
state political leaders including former Governor Deval Patrick and several Democratic State 
Representatives publicly supported the initiative. 
These supporters desired to increase the scope of the deposit system to include more types 
of beverage containers because bottle bills are considered more effective than curbside recycling 
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at redirecting waste from landfills (MASSPIRG). The proposed increase handling fee increase 
from 2.25¢ to 3.5¢ was supported by the Coalition for an Updated Bottle Bill because it provides 
more funds to redemption centers to keep afloat in a difficult economy for small businesses. The 
proposed changes in Question 2 would shift tens of millions of dollars generated per year from the 
unredeemed deposits of the covered containers into the preexisting “Clean Environment Fund” or 
CEF. This fund is legislatively allocated “to provide support for recycling, composting, solid waste 
source reduction, and other environmental programs related to the bottle bill.” While not all of the 
funds are actively put toward projects that “stimulate and support recycling, the bottle bill, and 
other innovative solid waste programs”—it still undoubtedly helps meet the environmental goals 
of many of the members of the supporting coalition (“Unclaimed Deposits”). 
         On the other side, the opposition to Question 2 organized themselves into a group called, 
“No on Question 2: Stop Forced Deposits.” Its members included Beverage Associations, Nestlé, 
and the Stop-and-Shop Supermarket Company. The proposed expansions were opposed by these 
groups because they require more of their products to be included in the deposit, additional 
organization, increasing transportation of used beverage containers, and raise out-of-pocket costs 
(Wiseman). This opposition also dislikes that the funds from the unclaimed deposits are held by 
the state for additional solid waste management, as it means that distributors and retailers are not 
reimbursed for the cost of the handling fee they are required to cover. 
         Similarly to other case study states in this research, the bottle bill opposition had access to 
a lot of money to fund “No on Question 2.” Spending over $9.1 million throughout the course of 
the campaign (outspending the proponents nearly ten times over), the opposition to Question 2 
framed its argument in three parts (Wiseman). First, they claim the bottle bill is a dated and old 
idea and that there are preferable alternatives. Second, they argue that expanding the bottle bill is 
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too expensive because it means that the state is using public money to fund the bottle bill system 
at an expanded level while it also pays for residential curbside recycling system for every resident. 
Lastly, the opposition claims that the CEF is not effective or active in improving recycling and 
solid waste management. 
         These three major messages were made public by television ads, pamphlets, radio 
messages, and whatever money could buy. Christina Wiseman of the Massachusetts Audubon 
Society described the scene during the campaign during an interview. “They [the opposition] 
bombarded TV channels with misleading ads, claiming that a ‘No’ vote on the expanded bottle bill 
would actually increase recycling. Not having much experience with campaigning myself, it was 
pretty infuriating to witness. They claimed that we needed to focus on expanding curbside 
recycling instead, as though a vote for them would somehow do that. In actuality they had no plan 
for how to increase curbside, but their messaging was everywhere.” 
  Concerns about the false nature of the data and information spread through these 
advertisements that “blanketed the airwaves” in the Boston Metropolitan area and across the state 
is brought up frequently throughout the course of the campaign (Abel). The Coalition for an 
Updated Bottle Bill tried to address the incorrect information through reaching out to the State 
Attorney General and through their own advertisements, but ultimately, “Our campaign couldn’t 
compete financially, and even once we started running our own TV ads it was too little too late” 
(Wiseman). 
         Additionally, the bottled water industry is unique in of itself which began in earnest in the 
1950’s at the same time that plastic, disposable containers entered the market. Bottled water comes 
into direct competition with municipal water systems but has largely been successful because it is 
marketed as pure and safe water, in contrast to the potential dangers of public water that 
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unfortunately occur in many United States cities and towns. However, many of these bottled water 
companies also get their water from municipal sources or through contracted access to rivers and 
streams on publically-owned land (Miller, 25).          
         By 2014 the Citizens United v FEC ruling had taken place and corporations and unions 
were experiencing newfound freedoms surrounding campaign finance (Citizens United). While a 
direct correlation cannot be proven here, Question 2’s campaign just four years after Citizens 
United was also one of the most expensive issue campaigns, from the opposition’s side, in the 
state’s history. It seems reasonable to suppose that the campaign was impacted by the recent 
expansion of the campaign finance system. 
         Massachusetts, as one of the original colonies of the country, has experienced a large 
amount of human-caused environmental change. As is described in the book Remaking Boston, 
the physical shoreline, local water quality, and other natural aspects of the region have been 
irreversibly changed by the nearly four centuries of Western-American presence in the region 
(Penna). While these types of impacts have unequivocally happened in many other places across 
the United States, the other three states in the scope of this research were not impacted as 
intensively as Massachusetts. In a recent Supreme Court case, Massachusetts led a group of states 
who sued the EPA for its attempt to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the auspices that 
they were pollutants and implicit in climate change. In the end the Court ruled that Massachusetts 
did have standing to sue, and that the EPA cannot regulate these kinds of emissions without first 
proving that current standards are insufficient or that there is a present danger that can be solved 
through regulation (Meltz). The fact that Massachusetts was the lead prosecutor in this case 
indicates that state leadership was willing to take a stand that many would consider “anti-
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environment” and also that Massachusetts leaders believed they had the political capital to go 
against the EPA. 
         It is important to note that the issue of the environment has become increasingly polarized 
across partisan lines over time. In the 1970s, many considered the environment to be a “politically 
consensual issue” as was greatly exemplified by the largely bipartisan support for environmental 
legislation under the Republican Nixon administration (McCright, 251). Since the consolidation 
of the American conservative ideology after the end of the Cold War, studies show that between 
1970 and 2012 there has been a steady decrease in support for environmental and conservation 
legislation among Republicans and a corresponding increase in support in Democratic politicians 
(McCright, 253). Therefore, as Massachusetts considered Question 2 in 2014, the electorate was 
considerably more polarized on the issue along partisan lines during the campaign than in any of 
the other case studies considered in this research. While there is a thriving environmental 
community in Massachusetts, especially within its urban areas, this sense of a state environmental 
culture is not as deeply incorporated into the state’s identity. Therefore, it does not appear that it 
was a centering point for bottle bill supporters to rally around.      
Concluding Comparisons: Washington and Massachusetts   
In the case of Washington and Massachusetts the political settings in which they existed 
were very different, with nationwide support for the policy in one and a campaign finance system 
in the other that greatly enables corporations to take control of campaigns through their donations. 
The defeat of Question 2 on the 2014 Ballot in the state of Massachusetts was made possible due 
to the unique combination of factors of a post-Citizen’s United campaign finance system, highly 
effective and expensive corporate messaging techniques, and the different perceptions of deposits 
on bottled water. The absence of a powerful environmental ethos in either state made it initially 
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more difficult to gather overwhelming public support that could mitigate the money-fueled tactics 
of the opposing coalition. 
Repeated attempts to pass bottle bill legislation on the ballot proved deadly in the past in 
Washington and has made Massachusetts bottle bill supporters wary of attempting to pass another 
expansion. Messaging tactics of innovative advertising was a powerful tool for the opposition in 
the case of Washington, while a complete saturation of media outlets was the preferred method for 
the “No on Question 2” campaign in Massachusetts. In Washington the supporting coalition was 
taken by surprise by the strength of the opposition in the first attempt to pass a bottle bill in 1970, 
and afterward was not able to overcome the advantage that the anti-bottle bill coalition held by 
putting out initial messaging and tweaking during the elections of 1979 and 1982. In 
Massachusetts, the supporting coalition was almost entirely made up of environmental groups and 
did not include the voices of small and local businesses in their efforts to expand the bottle bill. 
This gap in the coalition gave further legitimacy to the opposition’s claims that the bottle bill would 
be expensive and anti-business. In the next chapter the case studies are considered in conjunction 










Are Bottle Bills Triple Bottom Line Sustainable? An MSSD Comparison of Case Studies 
 
 
         While the previous chapters discuss in detail the different ways that bottle bill legislation 
can pass or not pass in the United States, there are also many takeaways from a consideration of 
how these systems are structured in very similar ways but have different results. This chapter uses 
Most Similar Systems Design, MSSD, to examine how the current-day, existing bottle bill systems 
in my case studies work using the same basic structure to have different results. This chapter will 
consider how the independent variables interact to create different results and levels of 
effectiveness for deposit systems in Oregon, Maine, and Massachusetts. Washington is excluded 
from this comparison because it does not currently have container deposit legislation. The 
following table shows the details of the independent variables for each state as well as the 
corresponding legislative outcome. 
Administration 
 The first variable for consideration is the overall administration of the bottle bill system. 
As has been previously mentioned, the administration of the Oregon Bottle Bill is run by the 
Oregon Beverage Recycling Cooperative (OBRC) in communication with the Oregon Liquor 
Control Commission (OLCC), which is the public agency that is responsible for enforcing 
compliance and any deserved penalties or fines. The OBRC is responsible for what Cherilyn 
Bertges, Outreach Manager, describes as the “day-to-day operations of the law.” This includes 
coordinating and implementing the retrieval of all the used beverage containers, connecting these 




Figure 6.1  
 
Since OBRC is run by a membership that represents nearly every distributor in the state of Oregon, 
the system is centralized and easily allows for coordination of the deposit refund system through 
this joint representative body of industry. Therefore, the 5¢ deposits from purchased containers 
can be forwarded from the retailers to OBRC, who then refund the retailers with the returned 
deposits weekly (Bertges). 
Despite being a legislatively initiated process in which any structural changes must be 
voted upon and passed, the administration of the bottle bill in Oregon uses almost no public money. 
This is because the process is funded by the funds from the unredeemed deposits that stay with 
OBRC, essentially the distributors (Bertges). Since distributors are motivated through their 
membership in OBRC to keep the rate of return high because they sell the recycled products to 
buyers in the recycling market – occasionally at Oregon recycling plants owned by OBRC – there 
is no perverse incentive to try and increase the amount of unredeemed containers. 
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OBRC presents an interesting model of governance, because the administration of the 
“recycling system [is run] by the same people who are making or distributing the regulated 
beverages” (Powell). It is the first of its kind and is being carefully watched and considered by 
those involved in solid waste management across the country because so far, it seems to effectively 
meld together the goals of the bottle bill with the goals of the beverage industry. All in all, the 
Oregon system is highly efficient and is continuously working to improve the procedures for 
redemption in the state. For example, in 2009 the state legislature passed an amendment to the 
system expanding the bottle bill in many ways, including increasing the deposit price to a dime in 
2017 (Spendelow). 
The administration of the Maine bottle bill was assigned quite ambiguously, but is now run 
through the state government (Maine’s Bottle Bill, 1977). It has recently been transferred from the 
Department of Agriculture to the Department of Environmental Protection, or DEP. DEP is 
responsible for managing the bottle bill, which includes coordinating finances, managing the 
location of redemption centers, distributor or retailer compliance, and dealing with issues of fraud. 
The funds for this system are paid by state funds, some of which may be from the deposits of 
unredeemed containers that the state of Maine partially retains through escheats if the distributor 
of those containers are not a part of the comingling agreement (“Unclaimed Deposits”). 
As was mentioned previously the Maine bottle bill law was written in such a way that “The 
distributor or manufacturer that actually puts the bottle into circulation is the one that is required 
to actually take it back out of circulation” (Milligan). This means that there are many different 
entities, including hired third party pickup agents, who are in charge of picking up the used 
beverage containers from all the retailers and redemption centers within the state of Maine. The 
presence of multiple actors within such a varied industry requires additional organizational steps, 
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which in turn makes the process more expensive and inefficient. Spendelow notes that the bottle 
bill in Maine “is set up in a way that really pushes the cost up a lot…Because different beverage 
companies sign up with different service companies to get the containers redeemed so they don’t 
have to go out there and do it themselves. When you go into a redemption center, you see a hundred 
containers and they are putting different thing in each one.” This sorting process increases 
expenses because it takes up a lot of time, labor and physical floor space. 
Massachusetts administers its bottle bill through the state’s Department of Environmental 
Protection, the finances are managed by the Department of Revenue, and the Attorney General’s 
Office, “deals with enforcement of any violations” with regulatory guidance from the Secretariat 
of Energy and Environmental Affairs (Sylver). The DEP is also responsible for some day-to-day 
operations of the bill including coordinating the stakeholders involved, problem-solving regulatory 
and planning issues, and issuing redemption center licenses. This delegation of roles of the separate 
parts of the Maine Bottle Bill between three state agencies allows for the specificity of work 
performance by each department, but also necessitates inter-department communication, 
especially because the state roles for regulation are not clearly specified in this law (Sylver).  
The funds for administering the bottle bill system are, in a sense, provided by the 
unredeemed deposits of used beverage containers, because some of those nickels go back into the 
Massachusetts State General Fund. However, the administration process is quite complicated and 
interacts with multiple state agencies, each with total budgets of greater than $29 million.  
Consequently, it is unclear if the funding from the unredeemed deposits even comes close to 
covering the costs of the time it takes to run the Massachusetts Bottle Bill. The decentralized nature 





  The deposit price per container is an important variable to consider in each of these three 
states’ bottle bills when trying to determine their systemic effectiveness. The deposit set on the 
container by the legislation is the incentivizing factor that allows for the functioning of the entire 
system. Attributing a monetary value to containers is therefore a disincentive to litter or otherwise 
not return deposit containers for redemption, meeting anti-litter and recycling goals. It 
simultaneously encourages picking up littered beverage containers. Therefore, the per-container 
price assignment value is critical because it influences the level of return of deposited containers 
as compared to the number of containers purchased with a deposit, called the redemption rate.  
The redemption rate of containers covered by the state’s deposit system indicate the level 
of participation in the system through comparing the number of containers purchased with the 
number returned. A higher redemption rate is preferable for the system to run effectively. High 
redemption rates allow the policy to achieve its goals of environmental conservation as well as to 
maintain a profitable and consistent product supply for recycling industries and other related 
aspects of local economy, such as redemption centers. This rate is highly influenced by the deposit 
price of the container and increases in correlation with deposit price. The redemption rates for the 
case studies in the scope of this research are listed in Figure 3.2. 
Research shows that "If states set their bottle deposit high enough, harvesting recyclables 
becomes viable employment for low-income households" (Ashenmiller, 2011). As deposits per 
container increase, redemption rates do as well. This encourages a higher level of recycling and, 
studies show, a lower presence of litter. This pricing is an indicator of the participation in the state 
deposit systems of Oregon, Maine, and Massachusetts, which consequently also suggests the level 
of environmental awareness in the state. It’s important to note that all of these states passed their 
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bottle deposit systems into law 25 to 45 years ago, at a time when a nickel was worth between 20 
and 28¢ today. Inflation is an important factor that makes a deposit system less effective because 
people are less incentivized to redeem containers for 5¢ each than they would be for 25¢ 
(Spendelow).   
In Oregon, there is a 5¢ deposit on all beverage containers except wine, liquor, milk, and 
milk substitutes9, and a 2¢ deposit on the small, “stubby” brown beer bottles that are commonly 
used at breweries. The redemption rate is for the state is calculated annually through the OBRC 
and the Department of Environmental Quality. In 2015, the redemption rate was 68.26%, which 
was much lower than the 94% redemption rate in 1973. Prior to the bottle bill’s implementation 
there was an estimated 25% return rate (Spendelow, 2004). While the redemption rate displays 
that public participation with the bottle bill has been decreasing over time, there are policies that 
have been put in place in Oregon to improve the effectiveness of the bill. Since the rate has dropped 
below 80% for two straight years, the 2011 expansion of the Oregon policy states that the deposit 
price will increase to 10 cents per container, after verifying calculations confirm the redemption 
rate (Oregon Deposit Law). The reasons for this decline are uncertain, but interviews and sources 
have indicated that it is largely because of the declining quality of experience during the 
redemption process along with the devaluation of the nickel since the bill’s original passage in 
1971. 
A major reason for the drop in the Oregon container redemption rate is because of the 
negative customer experience at redemption sites. Sources describe the time, outdoor location, 
mechanical malfunctions, and other inconveniences as reasons why the public participation rate 
has dropped down to below 70% (Spendelow, Powell). Additionally, at the setting of the reverse 
                                               
9 By 2018, as per the 2011 expansion of the bottle bill. 
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vending machines, which are automated machines that accept, count, and break down deposit-
covered beverage containers, “there’s often a population of people who are returning containers 
who, you know really need the money. They’re gleaners, they might be homeless or transient. And, 
other people they kind of don’t want to go to the return areas because they don’t want to hang out 
with them. For lack of a better word for that” (Bertges). This public perception has inspired a shift 
in Oregon from reverse vending machines to indoor redemption centers, which is discussed in 
detail later. 
Studies of litter reduction in Oregon under the bottle bill has resulted in a wide variety of 
figures, as different research used different percentages of beverage containers as a portion of the 
litter profile along with other methodological differences. Additionally, many of these types of 
studies are either conducted by or hired by groups that either actively support or oppose the bill. 
The level of Oregon litter reduction ranges from 10% to 47% in volume between two studies 
conducted in the state in 1974 (Gudger, ODEQ). The impact of this legislation on litter reduction 
in Oregon has been highly politicized, with the uncertainty of its numerical effectiveness giving 
fuel to the fire of the opposition.  
Maine has a 5¢ deposit price for all types of beverage containers except dairy products and 
unprocessed cider, and a 15¢ deposit on wine and liquor containers. Due to the many distributors 
and redemption center owners who are directly involved in the redemption of beverage containers 
in Maine, there is no singularly calculated redemption rate annually. However, in 2011, there was 
an estimated 90% participation rate in the recycling of beverage containers in the state of Maine 
(Lakeman). While this figure’s reliability is unclear, it is impressive that while many other states 
are struggling to keep up their redemption rates, Maine seems to maintain a very high participation 
rate in the bottle bill program. This is likely because there is a higher deposit price on wine and 
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liquor containers, and because the law is quite comprehensive in the types of containers it includes 
in the deposit system. Additionally, there is current discussion of the potential incorporation of 
Maine produced cider and blueberry juice into the scope of the law (Lakeman).  
Litter reduction under the Maine deposit law was found to be a 34-64% decrease in total 
litter in 1980. More anecdotally, municipal workers observed a significant decline in the amount 
of solid waste entering Maine landfills within just 4 months of the law's enactment (USGAO, 9). 
Additionally, as a state with a large tourist industry Maine would likely spend money to remove 
litter in order to maintain its pristine and rustic public image. Therefore, litter reduction 
structuralized as a bottle bill system is likely to save between $100,000-$250,000 for litter clean 
up annually (Ginn).  
The state of Massachusetts has a price of 5¢ on beer, malt, carbonated soft drinks, & 
mineral water containers. In 2014 the state had a 64.08% redemption rate of beverage containers 
through their deposit redemption system (Massachusetts Deposit Law). Massachusetts has both 
the lowest redemption rate and the least comprehensive type of legislation (in terms of types of 
containers included) of the three case study states considered in this section of my research. These 
realities along with the fact that this state has just a nickel value on all its returnables and has most 
recently experienced a huge anti-bottle bill campaign in 2014 makes it the least effective bottle 
bill in consideration of this research. Further, with the memory of the defeat of Question 2 looming 
in recent memory, sources say that there is currently no incentive or political capital for the 
legislature to try and update the bottle bill (Wiseman). 
A 1987 study in Massachusetts found a 30-35% decrease in litter after the bottle bill’s 
implementation in 1983 (EAF). However, between 2000 and 2010 the sales of juices, sports drinks, 
juices, and bottled water have increased their sales nationally by over four times. People in 
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Massachusetts who collect used beverage containers for redemption share that “it’s frustrating that 
most bottles they find aren’t redeemable” and call it “a waste” because many of these otherwise 
containers are going to landfills due to their lack of deposit (Abel). The Massachusetts bottle bill’s 
incomprehensive nature, political stagnation on the issue, and low deposit price degrades the 
efficiency of the entire system and makes the bottle bill increasingly less effective in achieving its 
goals of environmental conservation and litter reduction. 
Bottle Bills as a Social Service 
Bottle bill deposit systems are not only useful for environmental and economic 
motivations, but can also be a form of alternative income for people. A significant amount of users 
of the redemption system are fundraisers, unhoused, transient, or low-income people. Described 
as an unintended consequence of the bottle bill, which was specifically crafted with environmental 
goals to decrease litter and increase recycling, the potential to make money off of redeeming 
beverage containers is a widely accessible social service (Spendelow). 
         Many groups use the redemption of beverage containers as a technique for fundraising. 
Lakeman points out that in Maine, “a lot of our deposits or unclaimed deposits is a big source of 
charity around here. I remember as a kid doing a lot of bottle drives for sports teams and things 
like that.” Because of this, people know to save up a collection of their containers to give away if 
they are not going to redeem the deposits themselves. This format of donating containers is 
described as quite widely supported, and seems to be understood to be a social benefit of the bottle 
bill. 
         However, the public perception of the bottle bill as a social service mechanism changes 
when the users in consideration are not Girl Scouts or sports teams, but people experiencing 
homelessness, low-income, or who otherwise desire ways to make extra money. Interestingly, this 
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is an aspect of the bottle bill that “even its supporters are loath to mention” (Abel). A study shows 
that in Santa Barbara area of California, close to 60 percent of the income from redeemed deposits 
was collected by households earning less than $25,000 annually.  The study also found that the 
lowest one percent of earners – those making $10,000 or below – retrieve around 20 percent of the 
total value of all the beverage containers redeemed (Ashenmiller, 2011). 
As these people are typically not the initial purchasers of the beverage containers, many 
spend significant amounts of time collecting or scrounging for unredeemed beverage containers. 
This frequently includes going through public or private garbage or recycling receptacles. Bottle 
bills increase these informal activities through incentivizing recycling (Gowan, 2010). Though the 
1988 Supreme Court ruling of California v Greenwood defined one’s garbage as “outside the 
constitutionally guaranteed privacy of the home,” it is still a practice that is often frowned upon in 
many communities on the basis that the activity of scrounging constitutes “offensive conduct.” 
Some cities and municipalities have gone so far as to impose crackdowns on activities such as 
dumpster diving and bottle collection, calling it deplorable acts of “thievery” (Ferrell, 11). 
         Over the course of my interviews, different sources indicated the ways that their different 
communities interact with beverage container collection. Sarah Lakeman describes that her 
experience in Portland, Maine is that, “if I can’t make it to my redemption center I don’t put my 
bottles and cans in with my normal recycling but I would probably leave them separate because 
there are the same people that come around every week and they would look through everybody’s 
recycling bins for the bottles and cans to take. I’d save them, give them away to those people, or 
if I saw them go by I would run out and give them my bag.” My family in Portland, Oregon has 
similarly established a relationship with a homeless man in my neighborhood, for whom we collect 
our bottles and cans until the next time he visits. In Massachusetts, a newspaper article chronicles 
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the story of a low-income family in the city who depend upon the collection of deposit-covered 
containers for a significant portion of their income. These collectors note that Massachusetts’ 
Question 2 would have allowed them to, “redeem bottles from water, sports drinks, and other non-
carbonated beverages that they now ignore...and [they] could more than double their income” 
(Abel, 2014). 
         As was stated earlier, Oregon is switching its redemption system from one primarily of 
reverse vending machines to indoor, employee-run redemption centers. Much of the reason behind 
this is because, “it upsets a lot of people who live in the neighborhoods where a lot of people 
redeem things – they don’t particularly like homeless people coming through their area” 
(Spendelow). Therefore, many of these planned redemption centers are going to be in less 
centralized neighborhood spaces like grocery stores usually are. Most are placed in the suburbs 
and none of the redemption centers are in Downtown Portland, where there is a large community 
of unhoused people due to the presence of shelters and other services (BottleDrop Centers).  
When asked to consider if this change in Oregon’s system would impact accessibility of 
the bottle redemption process to homeless or low income people, people responded that it is likely 
to be “a tradeoff, of an environmental benefit to a social service loss” (Powell). As many low-
income or unhoused people don’t have easy access to a car, it seems likely that the disbursement 
of these redemption centers will make container redemption less accessible to many of the people 
for whom it provides the greatest social service (Ashenmiller, 64). With many states around the 
country switching to the system of redemption centers which provide jobs and a more regulated 
environment for redemption, this switch will change the way that the bottle bill can function as an 




Chapter 7  
The International Implications of Bottle Bills: Outsourcing Your Sense of Justice? 
 
 Recycling is often considered a beginner’s step toward sustainability and solid waste 
management. In some cases, recycling has also taken on the role of what I shall call “placebo 
environmentalism.” For example, in clinical trials of dangerous illnesses, some patients are given 
placebo medicine in response to which they may feel better, despite the fact that they were not 
actually given active medicine and the illness itself is probably still continuing. Some people 
consider placebos -- essentially the strength of human willpower -- to be enough to start a true 
healing process. Considering climate change as the “illness” in question and recycling as the 
placebo medicine, the latter is simply not enough to solve the former. And yet, as is depicted in 
the graphic novel As the World Burns, many people consider recycling to be sufficient 
environmental effort from the individual when it is actually playing into the capitalist and colonial 
system that originated the problem in the first place (Jensen, 2011). 
 While bottle deposit legislation greatly increases recycling rates, improves the quality of 
recyclable products, reduces litter, and many other benefits that are outlined throughout the course 
of this research, this study would be remiss in considering these systems under the TBL definition 
of sustainability if it did not ultimately ask, what happens to the recycled products after they are 
redeemed? The answer to this question varies widely state by state, but the options include: in-
state facilities, out-of-state facilities, and export of the product internationally. This final section 
of this research will consider the environmental, social, and economic implications of the 
international export of American recyclables, specifically to Asia, and with these realities in 
consideration can this action truly be considered “sustainable”? 
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Activism through consumerism is not a viable method to solve the pressing environmental 
problems that face the world today, but I do not hold any grandiose ideas that the bottle bill is a 
silver bullet environmental policy. Still, I think that bottle bills effect greater changes past 
consumer activism, due to its accidental role as a social service, how it provides opportunities for 
communities to learn to fight back against corporate interference in the political process, and 
because it creates a very clean recyclable product. This latter aspect has a large implication on 
issues of social and environmental justice, as is discussed in this chapter. 
Where do Oregon, Maine, and Massachusetts send their recycled products?  
Many distributors have specific relationships with domestic recycling plants for the 
specific types of recycled materials collected that can be collected through a bottle bill system:  
PET plastic, glass, and aluminum.10 Considering the three case study states with functioning bottle 
bills today, Oregon has completely eliminated its international export of redeemed recyclables 
from the Oregon bottle bill system. Prior to 2012 the OBRC sold its PET product to the highest 
bidder on the market, which was typically to a buyer in Asia. A quite low-value product, Cherilyn 
Bertges of the OBRC says that Asian markets were “the only place[s] we could really get money 
for it.” However, the cooperative became a partial owner of the Oregon PET, or ORPET facility 
in Southern Oregon. Afterward, most of the plastic products from ORPET stay in the Northwest 
of the country, although some of the buyers are located on the east coast. Glass is processed at a 
plant called Glass to Glass in Portland. Part of the reason that the parent companies of Owens-
Illinois and eCullet chose to locate their glass recycling facility in Portland is because, “the city 
has a reliable supply of waste glass provided through the 'Oregon container deposit programme'” 
                                               
10  It must be emphasized that the data presented from the recycling and waste industries is notoriously difficult to 
track and in some, cases, unreliable and should be treated more as estimations than fact. This is because these 
industries are societal byproducts and as many loads are mixed and are not precisely calculated (Minter, 2013).  
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(Packaging-Gateway). Oregon’s aluminum collected from the bottle bill is sent to the Midwest of 
the country, due to the absence of aluminum smelters in the Northwest region (Bertges). 
Aluminum smelting is a notoriously dirty and polluting industrial process (OECD, 9). 
In Maine the story of the end-product of the recyclable material is more difficult to follow 
because it is not a centrally organized system. All of the distributors who are involved in the bottle 
bill either directly pick up the redeemed containers of their products, or hire a contracted third 
party to do it for them. After that, the recycled material is in the hands of each of the distributors 
to decide where the products should go. Elizabeth Milligan of TOMRA, one of the third party 
pickup agencies for the redeemed beverage containers, says that the market dictates the end 
location of the glass, plastic, or aluminum that they collect on behalf of the beverage companies 
that contract them. She says that all materials go out of the state of Maine, glass is recycled at a 
plant called Strategic Materials in Massachusetts to be melted down for new bottlers or fiberglass. 
Aluminum is sent to the smelting factory Aloca in New York. The collected plastic products by 
TOMRA are sent to a wide variety of places, depending on the market prices and other forces. 
Milligan says that “some of it goes overseas, some it stays within the United States in various 
locations, and some of it goes to Canada.” These products can be turned into any number of plastic 
items including new bottles, polyester, fleece, carpet backing, or if it is a high quality it can be 
turned into resin (Milligan).  
In Massachusetts, my sources were not able to provide specific information about the next 
steps for the recycled products after they are recycled through the bottle bill system. Similar to 
Maine, Massachusetts relies upon the individual distributors—whether national beverage 
corporation or local brewing company—to transport the beverage containers after they are 
redeemed either through their own services or through a contracted pickup agent. Without 
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confirmation, it seems to be a reasonable conclusion that the path of Massachusetts’ recyclables 
are similar to those of Maine’s--that the glass stays in-state at Strategic Materials and aluminum 
also somewhere domestic such as Aloca. As Environmental Planner for the state of Massachusetts 
Sean Sylver points out that material, “coming out of the bottle bill redemption stream is very clean 
material because there’s really no sorting involved...from speaking with professionals who use 
recycled materials in the production of new materials they want those particular bales because they 
are clean and they know that they’re high quality. So from a domestic perspective from where in 
America you’re trying to produce goods to a certain standard...you are going to get domestic 
producers who are going to want that recycled material.” However, it seems that because PET 
plastic has a very low market value, frequently the only way to make a profit off of those materials 
is through export abroad, often to Asian markets. 
It is largely PET plastic material that is exported from U.S. bottle bill systems to Asia for 
recycling by container ship. China imports more than half of the world’s plastic exports, which is 
estimated to be around a $500 million dollar industry for the country (Guilford). As China is the 
most common destination for exported plastic such as those derived from bottle bill systems, this 
example will focus specifically on the situation of plastics in China, although plastics are also 
imported from the United States to places such as India and Thailand (Minter). Upon arrival in a 
Chinese port, most likely the plastics are sent to one of the 60,000 small, family-run plastic 
recycling workshops, likely in the Wen’an County in northeast China (Minter, 145). In Wen’an 
County, there are businesses that specialize in the recycling of certain kinds of plastics, including 
PET. There is a complete chain of industry present, “from sorting and cleansing, to melting, 
shredding, granulating, and molding” (China Daily US). 
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The Plastic Recycling Industry in Wen’an County, China  
While this import of recyclable plastic to places such as China is supported by market 
forces and helps meet the growing demand for plastics in the country, it is not without cost. Despite 
being more formalized than industries such as electronics recycling, the plastics recycling industry 
in China is endangering the health of the surrounding environment and the people involved in the 
industry. Just a quarter of a century ago, the Wen’an County area could be described as, “bucolic, 
– an agricultural region renowned for its streams, peach trees and simple, rolling landscape” 
(Minter, 146). Now, the pollution from these processes has made Wen’an County residents 
reluctant to drink the local water, for fear that it is contaminated (China Daily US). As Minter 
writes in his book, “nobody wants to live in Wen’an” (152). Families who can afford it spend most 
of their time outside of Wen’an, and quickly send their children out of the region to attend higher 
quality schools.  
A 2016 study finds that samples of Wen’an County road dust show accumulations of 
contaminants from plastics and heavy metals associated with plastic production that are 1-2 levels 
of magnitude higher than in other areas without plastic industry. These levels of contaminants 
exceed the recommended limits for children and pose a potential health risk to children over long-
term exposure through inhalation or direct contact with road dust (Tang et al, 634). A local resident 
notes that high blood pressure and movement-restricting pulmonary problems are commonplace 
here, even occurring in young people, which never used to happen (Minter, 157). He also 
recognized the problem of “the stress related to living in a, ‘dirty, stinky, noisy environment. It 
takes a physical and mental toll’” (152). Further, some companies indiscriminately provide 
Wen’an plastic processors exemptions to the Restriction of Hazardous Substances evaluation, 
which is a standardized test intended to require compliance to environmental, safety and health 
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standards (151). Further, “environmental and safety equipment is neither required nor available at 
the local equipment and chemical dealers” (148). 
In the past few years the Chinese government has been more active in acknowledging, and 
in some cases taking action, its country’s dangerous pollution problems. A major attempt to stop 
China from being used as a “dumping ground” for the west was when the government shut down 
the plastics recycling industry in Wen’an County in 2011. On grounds of addressing issues of 
pollution, the government banned all plastic material imports into the area. Without an alternate 
plan to address pollution or provide other forms of employment to the region, this attempt left 
hundreds of thousands of people without livelihoods, including a large migrant worker population 
from other areas of China (China Daily US). 
The policy shifted in February, 2013 when Beijing announced its new Green Fence policy, 
in which the nation shared their intention to reject “poorly sorted or dirty shipments of recyclable 
waste from foreign exporters” into China (Berg). China rejected 68,000 tons in the first five months 
of the Green Fence through random inspections and sent the shipments back to its country of origin 
at their expense. This policy puts the onus on countries like the United States to improve their 
quality, sorting, and decreased levels of contamination and has even suppressed prices of PET 
products on the west coast (Guy, 2013). However, as the Chinese demand for recycled plastics 
remains powerfully strong and illegal exports are being smuggled into the nation to meet this 
demand, it remains unclear how much impact the rejection of the worst-of-the-worst imports will 
have on the pollution levels, and health of people in places such as Wen’an County (Guilford). 
Bottle bill products from the United States are typically of high quality and are increasingly 
less likely to enter the international recycling market because of their demand domestically. If 
products are exported abroad from these systems, they are likely to be PET plastics. If this plastic 
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is sent to China, recyclables from bottle bill systems would probably pass a Green Fence 
inspection. Nonetheless, this analysis of the international plastic industry shows that the act of 
recycling in of itself is not as benign as the simple “sustainable” action that many perceive it to be. 
In actuality, recycling of plastics tend to result in environmental degradation and unsafe and 
unhealthy working conditions.  While bottle bill systems are less likely to contribute to the 
environmental injustices as outlined here in Wen’an County, they still contribute to the greater 

















Conclusions: Bottle Deposit Systems in the Bigger Picture 
 
 The exploration of the highly specific topic of container deposit legislation systems in the 
United States begets bigger questions about the past and present nature of the nation’s political 
climate, campaign finance system, environmental policy techniques, international export trends, 
and social class norms. The MDSD analytical framework allows for the comparison of states from 
different sides of the country to conclude the variety of ways that differing situations can result in 
either the passage or defeat of bottle bill legislation. The MSSD comparative system presents a 
framework for the similar bottle bill systems of Oregon, Maine and Massachusetts to display the 
reasons behind their different levels of effectiveness in meeting the bottle bill’s prescribed, and 
unprescribed goals of environmental protection and economic development. The overall 
conclusions of the effectiveness of these two systems of comparison sheds light on several methods 
of how the state political system can support or not support effective or ineffective bottle deposit 
systems on the state level.  
This research displays that if put to a vote, the state legislature tends to be a far more 
favorable method to pass bottle bill legislation than the public initiative or ballot system. The 
presence of strong political champions, the legislature’s structural ability to compromise and 
negotiate, the presence of a cross-sectoral supporting coalition, and the allocated relinquishment 
of power or economic benefit to beverage retailers or distributors within the bill are all critical 
factors in passing a bottle bill through the state legislature. Compromise is a critical part of politics, 
and bottle bills are no exception. This also leads to the conclusion that bottle bills have the potential 
to be an issue with bipartisan support, and must be so in order to pass in most state legislatures.  
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However, in the current polarized and highly partisan political climate—with the 
environment inexplicitly as one such polarizing issue—bipartisan bottle bill support for 
environmental policy such as bottle bill systems seems increasingly less likely. The bottle bill 
shows that the political climate wasn’t always this way, as Republican and Democratic politicians 
proposed and advocated for bottle bills in their states because of its multitude of benefits 
economically and environmentally. Remembering the successes of bipartisanship and the 
situations in which it was made possible is critical in the politically polarized and largely stagnant 
United States government that we see today. Yet, even in states such as Massachusetts, where just 
17% of the state legislature seats are filled by Republican politicians, legislative action to expand 
the existing bottle bill system still proves to be very politically tenuous. 
Through the public ballot, outreach and an effective messaging stance is critical to pass a 
piece of bottle bill legislation. As the goal is to convince the majority of the state to actively support 
in a bottle deposit system with a “Yes” vote in the election, a successful bottle bill coalition will 
organize widespread outreach, speakers, in attempts to unify the supporting voters, as was done in 
the state of Maine. This effort can be successful with either access to significant financial 
resources, or a passionate volunteer base. The latter is largely successful because grassroots 
movements gain their power from the passion of their supporters and the connectivity of people’s 
different communities (Hart, 2001). It takes a lot of time, energy and resources to win over the 
public’s support for a ballot initiative, especially in the face of heavy opposition. Therefore, it is 
important that the first ballot attempt is conducted at the appropriate time and is successful. After 
all, the state legislature will refuse to act on the issue for a while due to a perceived lack of public 
support from being defeated on the ballot. Further, the ballot itself will prove less and less forgiving 
because the opposition has already established a winning, hard-to-beat strategy. 
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The public ballot proves especially difficult to pass bottle bill legislation -- or more 
recently, any kind of legislation -- because of what McCuan and Stambough refer to as the 
professionalization of the initiative process (52). Through easy access to large amounts of 
resources in order to access superior consultants, advertisements, polls, or employees this new 
professionalization of what was intended to be the people’s legislative check on government, may 
itself directly pose a threat to the direct form of democracy that is the public ballot. The case of 
Massachusetts’ Question 2 in 2014 is a prime example of this professionalization. Through 
outspending the supporting coalition by more than 8 million dollars the bottle bill opposition was 
successfully able to concisely frame their messaging of the bottle bill as a tax through a deluge of 
advertisements. By getting voters to be even slightly uncertain about if a policy change will do 
them bad or good, the opposition has already won (Wiseman). Further, the example of the 1970 
campaign in Washington displayed that the competing presence of a proposed Litter Law disrupted 
support for the bottle bill on the same ballot. Alternative policies are often deadly to ballot 
initiatives, because choices divide public support and typically serve to confuse the messaging and 
differentiating purposes between the two proposals.  
 This examination of bottle bills tells a lot of information about the level of corporate 
influence in the United States today. First, it displays that corporate oppositional funding is 
omnipresent throughout all stages of and attempts to pass bottle bill legislation. This oppositional 
funding can prove dangerous, although not necessarily fatal to bottle bill systems.  
A key variable that can powerfully push back against the presence of massive amounts of 
corporate funding is an independent, environmental state cultural ethos. “Historical studies often 
treat environmental politics and environmental ideals as separate topics. In this book we trace their 
interaction. Politics drew inspiration from perceptions of the environment, and in turn politics 
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encouraged new ways of thinking about the environment” (Judd, 2003). This concept is 
particularly true in less-densely populated places such as Maine and Oregon11 that depend upon 
the pristine nature of their environment for the tourism industry, and the health of the rural and 
agricultural sector. However, this state ethos of environmentalism goes deeper than economic 
incentives. Judd and Beach’s concept of the “environmental imagination” describes the “core 
beliefs that animate the political defense of nature” (X). When combined with a well-organized, 
multi-sector coalition of supporters who work to validate this ‘environmental imagination’ through 
messaging and people-power, can prove triumphant. While many other states with bottle bills may 
have a state culture of environmentalism, it is typically those who successfully activate their 
environmental imagination who are able to pass heavily-opposed legislation such as bottle deposit 
systems, into law. 
Ultimately, in the grand scheme of a world with a changing climate, war and violence, 
volatile economic markets and a dwindling resource supply, bottle deposit legislation can appear 
to be just a drop in the bucket of progress, or contrastingly a slight inconvenience for the beverage 
industry. However, in a world of ‘corporate democracy’ in many ways it seems like no fish is too 
small to fry if profits may at all be affected by environmental policy (Coates, 657). Additionally, 
bottle bills display the issues that come from incorrect information being shared by campaigns as 
though they are fact. The case studies of Massachusetts and Washington especially display that 
this type of confusion, even if proven incorrect, can greatly shake public support. Bottle bills 
display on a micro level the macro issue of dirty corporate influence in the political system, and 
the great extent to which industry will act in order to protect its bottom line -- often at the expense 
of the environment.  
                                               
11 Oregon and Maine both had populations of less than 3 million when their bottle bill’s first passage (US Census). 
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 The bottle bill systems considered in this research also show how society tends to isolate 
its most vulnerable members, as well as exemplifies ways that social taboos, such as those that 
disapprove of scrounging through trash or recycling, can become incorporated into local or state 
law. The reason for this exclusion stems from the classist stigma within our society that causes 
non-homeless or middle-income people to dislike, or feel uncomfortable being in the presence of 
homeless or low-income people. Bottle bill systems were structurally intended as a policy for litter 
reduction and resource conservation, not as a social service. Over time, the administrators of bottle 
bill systems have been changing to better accommodate non-homeless or non-low income users to 
meet these environmental goals. It appears that during this process low-income, transient, and 
unhoused bottle bill users are directly being isolated from the social service that the bottle bill 
inadvertently provides. By recognizing this trend and bringing the issue to the administrators of 
the bottle bill, perhaps action can be taken to reverse this trend and serve all bottle bill users 
equally.  
In the end, one must ask, who does the bottle bill serve: the people who use and value it 
the most, or the people who are most easily welcomed into stores and community spaces? With 
these kinds of considerations in mind, the bottle bill provides a valuable opportunity to make 
environmentalism more accessible and intersectional, which are areas of needed improvement for 
the entire environmental movement. As Jensen writes, “the human species must acknowledge that 
any future that allows us to retain our humanity will jettison capitalism, patriarchy and white 
supremacy - and be based on an ecological worldview.” It is due to this reason that I framed this 
entire research project under a Triple Bottom Line definition of sustainability, because “without a 
rejection of the dominator logic of white supremacy and patriarchy, there is no future worth living 
in” (Jensen, 2013). 
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The political, environmental, and economic situations in the states profiled in this research 
have changed vastly since the passage of their original bottle bills. Sylver says that, “I think that 
any time you have a law that’s been around for thirty years there’s tweaks that need to occur…to 
make the system work more smoothly.” As time passes, inaction on updating the state’s deposit 
system in order to best fit its current situation does a disservice to the legislation and the people 
that it serves by making it a less effective policy. Despite the presence of barriers to passage such 
as corporate funding of opposition due to the allowances provided by Citizens United, the results 
from this research that outline the different ways that bottle bill campaigns were successful or 
defeated could prove useful in future attempts to keep state bottle bill systems comprehensive and 
effective through updates or attempted amendments or repeals. 
 Finally, an investigation of bottle bill systems and their effectiveness raises the question, 
who do we make environmental policy for? While many tout the many environmental, social and 
economic benefits of bottle bills, the greater systemic pressures that allow bottle deposit systems 
to function once they’re passed into law are due to the presence of domestic and international 
markets for the recycled products to continue to make more new products. While the reuse of 
existing material saves significant energy and some argue that “The worst, dirtiest recycling is still 
better than the very best clear-cut forest or the most up-to-date open pit mine,” it is important to 
remember that the underlying motivations making the system possible are entirely economic and 
profit-based (Minter, 7). The fact that bottle bills use the capitalist system to obtain environmental 
and social benefits along the way is significant to be sure. Yet, these non-economic values must 
be continually reinforced and protected at times because the policy is dependent upon an economic 
profit-based foundation that constantly threatens to overpower these other benefits.  
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 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has decidedly 
argued that the human-imposed combustion of fossil fuels has caused massive and unprecedented 
changes in climate and that these changes can greatly disrupt the basic functioning of life on the 
planet. Within this period of global crisis, it is critical to practice sustainably sound procedures in 
all aspects of human life, industry, and government.  Further, this crisis requires to urgent action 
to reduce resource consumption -- especially those that compound the impact of greenhouse gases. 
Resource conservation efforts are an important part of this work. The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) reports that recycling is an important adaptation and mitigation measure 
for the industrial sector as it can improve energy efficiency, reduce product demand through more 
intensive product use, and ultimately can “help reduce GHG emissions below the baseline level” 
(IPCC Synthesis Report, 102).  
This research displays the far-reaching impacts that even a statewide environmental policy can 
have and suggests that legislation of this kind is most easily passed through the state legislature, 
and oppositional funding can be overcome in a state that maintains a strong environmental ethos 
through the hard work of compromising, coalition-building, and grassroots organizing. The most 
effective bottle deposit systems are centralized and are self-funded, with the trailblazing example 
of OBRC showing new, innovative ways of structuring environmental. Bottle bills are a valuable 
and effective type of recycling because they produce a product of such high quality that it mostly 
does not feed into the international recycling market, which is a system that is fraught with social 
and environmental injustices. 
 The concept of the bottle bill was a spark within the nation’s ‘Environmental Imagination.’ 
It provided an innovative way to prioritize state environmental values over corporate desires. 
Bottle bills have played important roles in decreasing litter, conserving energy, creating clean 
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recyclable products, developing new jobs, and providing a valuable form of alternative income. In 
all of these areas, bottle bills have required people, industry, and government to think differently 
about the consumer culture and corporate interference in politics that pervades the United States. 
While bottle bill systems have not gotten close to solving these larger issues, they do initiate 
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